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Abstract
Wireless network access protocols are used in numerous safety critical
applications. Network availability is essential for safety critical applications,
since loss of availability can cause personal or material damage. An adversary
can disrupt the availability of a wireless network using denial of service (DoS)
attacks.
The most widely used wireless protocols are vulnerable to DoS attacks.
Researchers have published DoS attacks against IEEE 802.11 local area net-
works (LANs), IEEE 802.16 wide area networks (WANs) and GSM and UMTS
mobile networks.
In this work, we analyze DoS vulnerabilities in wireless network protocols
and define four categories of attacks: jamming attacks, flooding attacks,
semantic attacks and implementation specific attacks. We identify semantic
attacks as the most severe threat to current and future wireless protocols, and
as the category that has received the least attention by researchers.
During the first phase of the research project we discover semantic DoS
vulnerabilities in the IEEE 802.11 communication protocols through manual
analysis. The 802.11 standard has been subject to manual analysis of DoS
vulnerabilities for more than a decade, thus our results indicate that protocol
vulnerabilities can elude manual analysis.
We conclude that formal methods are required in order to improve protocol
robustness against semantic DoS attacks. We propose a formal method that
can be used to automatically discover protocol vulnerabilities. The formal
method defines a protocol model, adversary model and cost model. The
protocol participants and adversary are modeled as finite state transducers,
while the cost is modeled as a function of time. Our primary goal is to
construct a formal method that is practical, i.e. does not require a vast
amount of resources to implement, and useful, i.e. able to discover protocol
vulnerabilities. We verify and validate our proposed method by modeling the
802.11w amendment to the 802.11 standard using Promela as the modeling
language. We then use the SPIN model checker to verify the model properties
and experiments to validate the results.
The modeling and experiments result in the discovery and experimental
validation of four new deadlock vulnerabilities that had eluded manual analysis.
We find one deadlock vulnerability in 802.11i and three deadlock vulnerabilities
in 802.11w. A deadlock vulnerability is the most severe form of communication
protocol DoS vulnerabilities, and their discovery and removal are an essential
part of robust protocol design. Thus, we conclude that our proposed formal
method is both practical and useful.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Terminology
An electronic communication system consists of entities (e.g. laptop computers,
mobile phones and web servers) interconnected by an electronic communication
network1. The communication network provides a service: the interchange of data
between the entities. Communication networks are divided into two categories by
the physical medium used for the transmission of data: wired networks and wireless
networks. A wired network transmits data through physical cables (e.g. copper
or fiber optic cables), while a wireless network transmits data through an existing
medium such as air, water, rock or empty space. The most commonly used physical
medium for wireless communication networks is radio waves through air, to such an
extent that the term “wireless network” now is interchangeable with the term “radio
network”.
Communication networks are also divided into two categories based on topology:
access networks and transport (“backbone”) networks. An access network provides
a communication service to endpoints, i.e. the entities that wish to communicate.
A transport network aggregates traffic from multiple access networks and acts as a
traffic exchange between them.
Communication protocols define the rules for formatting of data and entity
behaviour in electronic communication systems. Data that is to be transmitted
through the network is formatted as a message2. A message contains the data
transmitted by the entity and/or data used to manage the communication network.
The entity behaviour defines when and how an entity should transmit a message and
how to react when it receives a message. The entity behaviour can be modeled as a
state machine3, where the action taken by the entity depends on previous sent and
received messages. The state machine consists of states and transitions between the
states.
A denial of service (DoS) attack against a communication network prevents
1The communication network also consists of entities such as switches and routers, but this level of
detail is not necessary for understanding the work presented here.
2We use the term “message” as a synonym for a protocol data unit (PDU).
3Some communication protocols, e.g. Aloha, are stateless and are not modeled using state machines.
We only consider stateful communication protocols in this work.
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authorized access to the communication service. A communication protocol may
contain vulnerabilities that can be exploited by DoS attacks. We define that a
communication protocol is robust if it has no such vulnerabilities.
In this work, we investigate the robustness of communication protocols used at
the data link layer in wireless access networks. Whenever we use the term “protocol”
by itself, we implicitly mean “communication protocol”.
1.2 Motivation
Our research effort is motivated by two current trends. The first trend is that wireless
networks are increasingly being used in safety critical applications. Wireless networks
are used in life critical medical devices, public safety communications, road safety
systems, supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA) systems and alarm and
surveillance systems. The second trend is that these wireless networks are commonly
constructed using commercial off the shelf (COTS) equipment. COTS equipment
offers significant cost reductions due to economies of scale and competition between
equipment manufacturers. The communication protocols used by COTS equipment
are defined by standards, developed and published by organizations such as IEEE
and 3GPP. Standard protocols facilitate the interoperability of equipment from
different manufacturers.
Safety critical applications require network availability, since loss of the network
communication service could cause or aggravate personal and material damage.
Communication protocol reliability and dependability has been studied extensively
for several decades. The results of this research have improved network protocol
robustness against random or accidental failures that cause loss of availability. Fur-
thermore, the protocol security properties confidentiality, integrity and authenticity
are well understood due to extensive research. State of the art protocols are not
vulnerable to any known attacks against these properties. Conversely, the research
on protocol robustness against intentional failures, or directed attacks against service
availability, is not a mature area of research. Such attacks, denial of service (DoS)
attacks, disrupt the availability of a network communication service. The research on
wireless network protocols during the last two decades has shown that the protocols
currently in use are vulnerable to a wide array of DoS attacks. Furthermore, the
results indicate that protocol DoS vulnerabilities frequently elude manual analysis
during the protocol design process.
Formal methods have been successfully applied to the analysis of the confidential-
ity, integrity and authenticity properties of protocols. The motivation for the use of
formal methods to verify these properties is that experience has shown that manual
analysis is not sufficient if the security goals are to be achieved. The same line of
reasoning could be applied to the analysis of protocol availability. Thus, the primary
goal of our research is to determine if and how formal methods can be applied to
the analysis of protocol DoS vulnerabilities, and thus contribute to the construction
of more robust protocols.
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1.3 Methodology, Research Goals and Results
We divide the research project into three main phases. In the first phase, we perform
a literature review. Our primary goals are to identify known attacks against current
protocols, to categorize the attacks, and to find related work on the use of formal
methods to model protocol availability. Section 1.5 presents the related work on
formal methods. We identify four attack categories during the first phase: jamming
attacks, flooding attacks, semantic attacks and implementation specific attacks.
Section 1.4 presents the categories in more detail. The last category, implementation
specific attacks, is not related to the protocol design. Thus, this category of attacks is
considered out of scope. The results from the first phase indicate that one particular
category of DoS attacks, the semantic attacks, is not well understood. Furthermore,
the history of published attacks against wireless access network protocols show that
semantic attacks are the most severe DoS threat to such networks. Semantic attacks
are easy to implement, require no specialized hardware, and can be performed with
very little effort. Conversely, a significant research effort has been spent on modeling
jamming and flooding attacks. The results of this research are formal methods and
models to discover and verify jamming and flooding vulnerabilities. Thus, semantic
attacks are selected as the focus of the work in the second and third phases.
In the second phase, we select the medium access control (MAC) protocols of the
IEEE 802.11 standard as the protocols to be studied and modeled. We have three
main motives for selecting 802.11. First, several protocol DoS vulnerabilities had
already been discovered in the 802.11 standard. The standard had been subject to
extensive manual analysis, thus it is an appropriate test subject for the use of formal
methods. Second, readily available software and hardware for experimentation with
802.11 facilitate the experimental validation of our analytical results. Furthermore,
we can experiment without the need for a spectrum license, since 802.11 supports
the unlicensed 2.4 GHz industrial, scientific and medical (ISM) frequency band and
the 5 GHz Unlicensed National Information Infrastructure (U-NII) frequency band.
Third, a new amendment to the standard, 802.11w, was recently developed. Part
of the motivation for this amendment is to prevent semantic DoS attacks. We thus
focus on 802.11w in particular, to study the effects of the protocol modifications
proposed by the amendment. The second phase consists of manual analysis of the
protocols and experimental validation of the DoS vulnerabilities found. The results
in Paper A in Chapter 2 and Paper B in Chapter 3 show that significant and practical
vulnerabilities are discovered by this manual analysis.
In the third phase, we specify, implement and verify a formal protocol model,
adversary model and cost model. Furthermore, we experimentally validate the
verification results. Our primary goals of this phase are to construct a practical
formal method for the analysis of semantic DoS vulnerabilities in protocols, and
to determine if this formal method can be used to find new vulnerabilities that
had eluded manual analysis. The results in Paper C in Chapter 4 and Paper D in
Chapter 5 show that we discover four new deadlock vulnerabilities through the use
of the proposed formal method. Furthermore, we demonstrate that a simple model
can yield significant and useful results.
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1.4 Denial of Service Attack Categories
We divide wireless network DoS attacks into four categories. The categories are
based on the published attacks found in the research literature. The four categories
are jamming, flooding, semantic and implementation specific.
An implementation specific attack targets implementation vulnerabilities in
software or hardware, and involves the transmission of invalid protocol messages.
The adversary may use an invalid message format, an invalid message payload,
or both, to trigger a bug in the protocol implementation. A classic example of
an implementation specific attack is the buffer overflow, where an adversary can
overwrite memory segments to cause a crash in the software processing the messages.
Buffer overflows can be avoided by strict bounds checking in software, but are still
a significant problem in deployed systems. Implementation specific attacks are not
related to the protocol design, since a correct protocol implementation would discard
invalid messages. We thus consider implementation specific attacks as out of scope
for our investigation.
A jamming attack is mounted by emitting noise in the radio frequency band
used by the wireless network. The noise reduces the signal to noise ratio, causing a
degradation of communication service performance or a DoS. The effectiveness of
a jamming attack depends on the adversary’s emission power and the bandwidth
of the wireless network and emitted noise. A network that uses frequency hopping
over a broad frequency band is less susceptible to jamming than a network that
uses a narrow frequency band for communications. Furthermore, the physical layer
protocols used by the wireless network can amplify the effects of a jamming attack.
For example, a jammer can cause DoS against wireless networks that use carrier
sense (CS) mechanisms for medium access even if the emitted noise is low power
and narrowband. If the adversary can correctly modulate the noise so that the
communicating parties interpret it as a valid signal, then the network will not be able
to provide a communication service. An adversary typically has to use specialized
hardware to mount a jamming attack. An exception to this rule is the case where
test modes on standard network equipment can be exploited to turn a standard
networking interface card into a jammer. An example of a jamming attack exploiting
network interface card test modes is the 802.11 DSSSTEST mode attack described by
Wullems et al. [1]. This jamming attack causes a DoS even with low power emissions
by the adversary due to the use of a CS mechanism in the 802.11 physical layer.
A flooding attack disrupts the network communication service through the
exhaustion of resources. The targeted resource could be bandwidth, computational
capacity, memory capacity or available energy. An adversary will transmit a large
number of valid protocol messages during a flooding attack. If the recipient has
to perform expensive computations for each message, then the flood of messages
may exhaust all the available computational resources. Similarly, if the recipient
has to store state information for each message, then the result may be a total
exhaustion of available memory. Transmitting a large number of messages to a
battery powered device could exhaust all the energy available to the recipient, thus
causing a DoS condition. A classic example of a flooding attack is the Transmission
Control Protocol (TCP) Synchronize (SYN) attack [2]. The TCP SYN message is
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the first message of the TCP 3-way handshake used for connection establishment.
The recipient stores a state for each connection. If the adversary transmits a large
number of TCP SYN messages, then the recipient will eventually exhaust the available
memory used to store connection states, and thus refuse to accept new connections.
Proposed countermeasures against flooding attacks include cryptographic puzzles [3]
to offset the recipient’s computational cost and client cookies [4] to offset the
recipient’s memory cost. A flooding attack can be mounted using standard network
equipment, since the adversary transmits valid protocol messages.
A semantic attack exploits protocol vulnerabilities to desynchronize the protocol
state. An adversary mounts a semantic attack by transmitting one or more valid
protocol messages. The semantic attack triggers a state transition in the recipient,
which can cause a non-synchronized state for the communicating parties. The non-
synchronized state may be permanent (deadlock) or temporary. One example of a
semantic attack is the deauthentication attack against IEEE 802.11 networks [5],
where the adversary can reset the state of a protocol participant by transmitting a
single 802.11 Deauthentication Notification message. The protocol participants must
exchange several messages before they are able to recover to a synchronized state.
The deauthentication attack illustrates an important property: semantic protocol
vulnerabilities can function as an amplifier for the adversary. By transmitting a single
message, the adversary forces the participants to exchange multiple messages in order
to recover. Due to this property, an adversary exploiting semantic vulnerabilities
can cause a DoS condition with less transmission time than an adversary using
jamming or flooding attacks. A semantic attack can be mounted using standard
network equipment, since the adversary only transmits valid protocol messages. The
discovery and prevention of protocol vulnerabilities to semantic DoS attacks is the
main focus of the work presented in this report.
1.5 Related Work
In 1994, Needham published an article giving an example of a denial of service threat
and possible countermeasures [6]. In this article, he points out the lack of research
effort on this topic:
Security threats are often divided into three categories: breach of
confidentiality, failure of authenticity, and unauthorized denial of ser-
vice. The first two have been very extensively studied; confidentiality
in particular has been pursued to extraordinary lengths. Indeed, some
publications on confidentiality recall medieval disputes about how many
angels could stand on the head of a pin. The second has been the subject
of inquiry for many years, and is remarkable for the extent to which it is
easy to devise wrong protocols. The third has been much less studied,
and indeed, the tendency has been to dismiss it as a topic for serious
inquiry [...]
Meadows proposed a formal framework for evaluating network denial of service
attacks in 1999 [4]. The framework can be used to model authentication and
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key agreement protocol vulnerabilities to flooding attacks. One of Meadows’ key
observations is that the adversary models used in cryptographic protocols, such
as the Dolev-Yao model [7], are not suitable for modeling denial of service. The
Dolev-Yao adversary can delete any network message, and thus always cause denial
of service. Meadows introduced adversary and defender cost functions as part of the
model, since a realistic adversary will have limited resources. The cost functions are
not defined in Meadows’ framework, so a user of the framework has to quantify cost
and define the cost functions. Examples of cost include computational cost, memory
cost, energy cost, monetary cost and bandwidth cost. The goal of the framework
is to verify that the protocol will stop its execution if the cumulative defender cost
exceeds a tolerance bound.
Leiwo et al. published a survey of flooding attacks and protocol vulnerabilities in
2000 [8]. Their paper also proposed protocol design principles to reduce protocol
vulnerabilites to flooding attacks.
In 2003, Meadows published a review paper on formal methods for protocol
analysis [9]. In this paper, denial of service attacks were identified as a growing
threat, but the paper concludes that little work had been done on applying formal
methods to analyze the denial of service robustness of protocols. Research challenges
identified in this paper include developing new adversary models and the development
of models, methods and tools to provide assistance to protocol designers.
Further results based on Meadows’ framework were published by Ramachandran
[10], Smith [11] and Tritilanunt [12] in 2002, 2007 and 2009, respectively. Other
approaches to modeling flooding attacks include game theory [13, 14] and process
algebra [15].
The research efforts on modeling flooding attacks have been motivated by the
threat of Internet distributed denial of service (DDoS) attacks. In a DDoS attack,
the adversary initiates a large number of protocol intances. The modeling of flooding
attacks has thus focused on balancing the cost between the protocol initiator and the
protocol responder so that a high cost for the responder implies a high cost for the
initiator. The most significant difference between the related work on flooding attacks
and our work is that the models for flooding attacks are based on the assumption
that the adversary initiates the protocol instance. Furthermore, they assume that
the adversary cannot directly interfere with established protocol instances. These
assumptions are valid for DDoS attacks, but they are not valid for semantic attacks
against wireless access networks. An adversary can eavesdrop on all messages and
transmit messages at any time when attacking a wireless access network. Our
proposed method and models are not based on these assumptions, our adversary is
able to transmit messages at any time during a protocol run and to interfere with
established protocol instances.
Pelechrinis et al. published a comprehensive survey of jamming attacks, detection
and prevention in 2010 [16]. The survey includes quantitative jamming efficiency
metrics and adversary goals. The adversary goals are defined as maximized jamming
gain, targeted jamming and reduced probability of detection.
To the best of our knowledge, the only other research effort to model semantic
protocol vulnerabilities is presented in a paper by Narayana et al. [17]. They construct
a formal model of a subset of the 802.16 MAC layer protocols using the temporal
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logic of actions (TLA+), then use the TLA+ model checker (TLC) to discover
semantic DoS vulnerabilities. One major difference between the results in [17] and
the work presented here is that Narayana et al. did not discover any significant
protocol vulnerabilities through the use of their formal model.
1.6 List of Papers, Summary and Contributions
The goal of the work presented in this report is to contribute to the construction
of robust wireless access network protocols. In particular, the work focuses on how
to construct formal models for the verification of semantic DoS vulnerabilities in
protocols. The research results indicate that manual analysis of protocols is not
sufficient, and that formal methods should be used in order to detect and prevent
protocol vulnerabilities. We propose a method for how to construct and verify
protocol, cost and adversary models, and demonstrate how the models can be used
to discover severe vulnerabilities in widely used protocols. Our research results are
published in four papers:
Paper A, Chapter 2
Martin Eian
“Fragility of the Robust Security Network: 802.11 Denial of Service”
Proceedings of the 7th International Conference on Applied Cryptography and Net-
work Security (ACNS’09)
Paper B, Chapter 3
Martin Eian
“A Practical Cryptographic Denial of Service Attack Against 802.11i TKIP and
CCMP”
Proceedings of the Ninth International Conference on Cryptology And Network Secu-
rity (CANS 2010)
Paper C, Chapter 4
Martin Eian and Stig F. Mjølsnes
“The Modeling and Comparison of Wireless Network Denial of Service Attacks”
Proceedings of the 3rd ACM SOSP Workshop on Networking, Systems, and Applica-
tions on Mobile Handhelds (MobiHeld ’11)
Paper D, Chapter 5
Martin Eian and Stig F. Mjølsnes
“A Formal Analysis of IEEE 802.11w Deadlock Vulnerabilities”
Proceedings of the 31st Annual IEEE International Conference on Computer Com-
munications (IEEE INFOCOM 2012)
Paper A presents a manual analysis of DoS vulnerabilities in the the 802.11
medium access control (MAC) layer with the 802.11i and 802.11w amendments. This
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paper makes three principal contributions. First, we present and analyze a previously
unknown DoS vulnerability in the 802.11 standard. Second, we experimentally
validate the new DoS vulnerability together with the deauthentication attack and
another vulnerability discovered by J. Epstein in 2007 [18]. Third, we propose a
robust solution to the MAC layer DoS vulnerabilities in 802.11.
Paper B presents a manual analysis of a cryptographic DoS vulnerability in the
802.11i Temporal Key Integrity Protocol (TKIP). This paper makes five principal
contributions. First, we analyze the 802.11 standard and discover a highly efficient
cryptographic DoS attack. Second, we show that the attack also works against
clients using counter mode with cipher block chaining message authentication code
protocol (CCMP) as the pairwise cipher in networks that support both TKIP and
CCMP. Third, we demonstrate that the attack works even if 802.11e quality of
service (QoS) support is disabled in the AP. Fourth, we implement the attack and
experimentally validate the analytical results. Fifth, we propose a robust solution to
the vulnerability and temporary measures to limit the exposure to the vulnerability.
Paper C presents a formal method and model for evaluating wireless network
protocol vulnerabilities to semantic DoS attacks. We analyze the adversary goals
to find an appropriate quantification of the adversary cost. We then quantify the
protocol participant cost, and propose an attack efficiency definition. Finally, we use
our model to discover a new deadlock vulnerability in the IEEE 802.11 family of
standards, followed by an experimental validation of the vulnerability. The proposed
formal method is not protocol specific, it can be used to analyze any wireless protocol.
Paper D presents our application of the formal method proposed in Paper C
for the analysis of deadlock vulnerabilities in the IEEE 802.11 MAC layer with
the 802.11i and 802.11w amendments. The main contribution in Paper D is a
demonstration of how formal methods can be used to find deadlock vulnerabilities.
In particular, we investigate how to automatically discover vulnerabilities through
the construction and verification of a formal protocol model. Our work bridges
the gap between theory and practice by giving a detailed description of how to
construct and verify a simple and useful protocol model, including the complete
model source code. The proposed approach to modeling and verification could help
protocol designers discover deadlock vulnerabilities at an early stage of the design
process.
Our contributions could help communication protocol designers find and amend
semantic DoS vulnerabilities. However, semantic DoS vulnerabilities is still not
a mature research area, and there are several open problems. The next section
describes open research problems and suggested directions for future research within
this field.
1.7 Open Research Problems
A major challenge is how to integrate the different types of models used to evaluate
protocol properties. Currently, a protocol designer would have to use one model
to evaluate confidentiality and authenticity properties, another model to evaluate
vulnerabilities to flooding attacks, and yet another model to evaluate vulnerabilities
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to semantic attacks. Ideally, a generic protocol description language and modeling
tool that could verify all of these properties should be constructed. This would
significantly reduce the work required by the designer, and thus further the use of
formal methods in protocol design.
The cost model proposed in this work is simple. A simple cost model facilitates
the model construction, but a more realistic cost model may provide a higher degree
of validity. The cost model must be based on the adversary constraints, and the
model assumptions must be carefully evaluated. For example, we assume that an
adversary will limit his transmission time to a minimum. If this assumption does
not hold, then the model verification results may not be valid.
Another avenue of research could be to investigate the real time properties
of protocols. Our proposed model does not support the verification of real time
properties. Thus, timing related semantic DoS attacks might be possible even against
a protocol that has been verified as not vulnerable using our model. One would have
to use a model checking tool with real time support, such as Uppaal, in order to
model real time properties.
In a more long time perspective, protocol design principles should be derived from
the model verification results. As common types of attacks and vulnerabilities are
identified, techniques to counter them could be developed. Protocol design principles
that counter flooding attacks are fairly well understood today, but the same does
not hold true for semantic attacks.
Finally, other protocols could be modeled and verified using our proposed method.
We have only constructed a model of the 802.11 protocols, but our method could be
used on other wireless protocols, such as the protocols used in 802.16, 802.22, GSM,
UMTS and LTE.
1.8 Thesis Structure
The rest of the Thesis is structured as follows: Part II contains four papers. All four
papers have been peer reviewed before being accepted for publication. The papers
have undergone minor editing and reformatting before their inclusion in this thesis.
Paper A, in Chapter 2, presents semantic DoS vulnerabilities in 802.11w and
a proposed solution to remove the vulnerabilities. The paper was published and
presented at the 7th International Conference on Applied Cryptography and Network
Security (ACNS’09) in Paris-Rocquencourt, France [19]. The proceedings were
published in the Springer Lecture Notes in Computer Science (LNCS) series.
Paper B, in Chapter 3, presents a new cryptographic DoS vulnerability in 802.11i.
The paper was published and presented at the Ninth International Conference on
Cryptology And Network Security (CANS 2010) in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia [20].
The proceedings were published in the Springer Lecture Notes in Computer Science
(LNCS) series. The results presented in Paper A and Paper B were obtained by
manual analysis in the second phase of the research project.
Paper C, in Chapter 4, proposes a formal method for the modeling of semantic
DoS vulnerabilities. Furthermore, it presents a deadlock vulnerability in 802.11i
discovered through the use of the proposed method. The paper was published and
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presented at the 3rd ACM SOSP Workshop on Networking, Systems, and Applications
on Mobile Handhelds (MobiHeld 2011) in Cascais, Portugal [21]. Chapter 4 also
includes additional material that was removed from Paper C due to space constraints
and thus not peer reviewed. The parts that are not peer reviewed are included as
subappendices (4.A, 4.B and 4.C). This additional material illustrates in detail how
the proposed cost model in Paper C could be used to quantify the cost of semantic
DoS attacks against 802.11.
Paper D, in Chapter 5, applies the formal method proposed in Paper C to the
formal analysis of 802.11w. Three new deadlock vulnerabilities were found in 802.11w
through automatic model checking of the formal model. The paper illustrates the
detailed construction of the formal model, and includes the complete model source
code. The paper was published and presented at the 31st Annual IEEE International
Conference on Computer Communications (IEEE INFOCOM 2012) in Orlando,
Florida, USA [22]. The results presented in Paper C and Paper D were obtained
during the third phase of the research project.
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Abstract
The upcoming 802.11w amendment to the 802.11 standard eliminates the
802.11 deauthentication and disassociation Denial of Service (DoS) vulnerabil-
ities. This paper presents two other DoS vulnerabilities: one vulnerability in
draft 802.11w implementations discovered by IEEE 802.11 TGw, and one new
vulnerability in 802.11, which is still present in the 802.11w amendment. At-
tacks exploiting the first vulnerability are significantly more efficient than any
known 802.11 DoS attacks, while attacks exploiting the second vulnerability
have efficiency and feasability equivalent to a disassociation attack. This paper
provides an experimental verification of these attacks, demonstrating their
feasability using freely available software and off the shelf hardware. Finally,
the root cause of these vulnerabilities is discussed and a backwards compatible
solution proposed.
2.1 Introduction
In the original IEEE 802.11 standard [23], ratified in 1997 and accepted as an ISO
standard in 1999, the only available security mechanism was Wired Equivalent
Privacy (WEP). During the years that followed, WEP was analyzed by the academic
community and wireless hackers, and several vulnerabilities were discovered [24]
[25] [26]. This motivated the development of a replacement for WEP, IEEE 802.11i.
In 2004, the 802.11i amendment was ratified, with two new and improved security
mechanisms. The first one, Temporal Key Integrity Protocol (TKIP), was designed
as a transitional solution that would support old hardware. The second, counter
mode with cipher-block chaining message authentication code protocol (CCMP),
was the long term solution to the security vulnerabilities of WEP. The common
denominator for WEP, TKIP and CCMP is that they protect 802.11 data frames.
No protection is provided for control frames and management frames.
One issue with the lack of management frame protection is that any station on the
wireless network can transmit forged management frames. This tactic can be used by
an attacker to make a station (STA) deauthenticate or disassociate from the access
point (AP). The following association request from the station gives the attacker the
service set identifier (SSID) of the wireless network, thus bypassing SSID cloaking.
Furthermore, dictionary attacks against TKIP or CCMP using a password derived
preshared key (PSK) require that the attacker observes the initial 4-way handshake,
and a successful disassociation attack will result in this 4-way handshake between
the wireless station and the AP. Last, but not least, transmitting deauthentication
or disassociation frames several times per second is a very efficient Denial of Service
attack on the wireless network. Aireplay-ng from the aircrack-ng [27] suite is an
example of a freely available tool that implements the deauthentication attack. One
countermeasure to these attacks is to provide integrity and replay protection for
management frames.
Another issue that has surfaced recently is that several of the new amendments
to the 802.11 standard extend the use of management action frames, transmitting
potentially sensitive information inside management frames. Examples of such
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amendments are 802.11k, 802.11r and 802.11v. To avoid the compromise of sensitive
information, management frame confidentiality must be provided.
As a response to the above mentioned issues, Task Group w (TGw) was established
in 2005 to develop the 802.11w amendment, Protected Management Frames. The
original target date for ratification of this amendment was September 2007, but
this was later postponed to December 2009. The design goal for 802.11w was to
extend the security mechanisms in 802.11i to provide protection for selected 802.11
management frames. 802.11w is currently in draft status. The newest available draft
version is 7.0.
The results presented in this paper are based on IEEE 802.11-2007 [28], which in-
cludes the 802.11i amendment [29], and 802.11w draft version 3.0 [30] from September
2007. One additional feature from 802.11w draft version 4.0, protection against SA
termination attacks, is also discussed. The analysis of potential DoS vulnerabilities
in 802.11 with amendments is based on the observations in [4].
The rest of the paper is divided into eight sections. Section 2 presents the
contribution. In Section 3, a short description of related work on 802.11 DoS
vulnerabilities is presented. Section 4 contains an analysis of relevant topics from the
802.11 standard with amendments. Section 5 presents theoretical DoS vulnerabilities
in 802.11, 802.11i and 802.11w and some general observations on network DoS.
Section 6 provides a description of the experiments, analysis and results. The results
are discussed in Section 7, and a solution proposed in Section 8. Section 9 contains
the conclusion and section 10 contains acknowledgements.
2.2 Contribution
This paper analyzes medium access control (MAC) layer DoS vulnerabilities in
802.11 with the 802.11i and 802.11w amendments. One apology for MAC layer DoS
vulnerabilities is that an attacker can use physical jamming of the radio frequencies to
perform a DoS attack anyway, which is extremely difficult to prevent. The motivation
for preventing DoS attacks against the MAC layer is that such attacks are far more
efficient than jamming, so the attacker has to spend less effort, and thus will be
more difficult to detect and locate. Furthermore, certain attacks against MAC layer
vulnerabilities may cause a deadlock such that a station is not able to recover. A
jamming attack, on the other hand, will only disrupt network access for as long as
the attacker is transmitting.
The configuration used for the experimental analysis is an extended service set
(ESS) with a wireless station communicating with an AP. The term station refers to
either a non-AP 802.11 device or an AP.
This paper makes three principal contributions. First, a previously unknown
DoS vulnerability in 802.11, equivalent to the disassociation vulnerability, and still
present in 802.11w, is presented and analyzed. Second, this new vulnerability is tested
experimentally together with the deauthentication attack and another vulnerability
discovered by J. Epstein in 2007 [18]. All experiments were carried out using freely
available tools and off the shelf hardware. Third, a robust solution to the MAC layer
DoS vulnerabilities in 802.11 is proposed. It is possible to introduce this solution
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Figure 2.1: 802.11 open system authentication and association.
incrementally, preserving backwards compatibility until all APs and stations are
upgraded.
2.3 Related Work
In 2003, Bellardo and Savage demonstrated the feasability and efficiency of the
802.11 deauthentication attack, together with several other DoS attacks against the
802.11 MAC layer [5]. [5] is a useful general reference on DoS attacks against 802.11
networks. In 2007, J. Epstein presented the theoretical SA termination attack [18]
and a proposed solution [31] to TGw, which was accepted as part of draft 4.0 of
the 802.11w amendment in 2008. The SA termination attack and the proposed
solution are analyzed in this paper. The working documents of TGw are available at
https://mentor.ieee.org/802.11/documents.
2.4 Analysis of the 802.11 Standard
Only the most relevant parts of the 802.11 standard and the 802.11i and 802.11w
amendments are presented as background material. The reader is referred to the
IEEE standard and draft documents for a comprehensive review.
2.4.1 802.11 Authentication and Association
The original 802.11 standard specifies two types of authentication: shared key and
open system. The shared key authentication is optional in WEP, and the open
system authentication is a two-message null authentication initiated by the station.
After authentication, the station performs an association with the AP. Figure 2.1
shows a successful open system authentication followed by a successful association.
Associations are used to keep track of the stations served by an AP. The 802.11
standard defines two state variables: authentication state and association state.
Three of the four possible combinations of these two variables represent the local
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Table 2.1: 802.11 States
State 1 Not authenticated Not associated
State 2 Authenticated Not associated
State 3 Authenticated Associated
802.11 station states shown in Table 2.1. Every station maintains a local state for
every other station that it communicates with.
802.11 frames are grouped into classes that correspond to the states mentioned
above. Frames corresponding to the current state or lower are allowed, thus the
allowed frames in State 2 are of Class 1 or 2. If a station receives a Class 2 or 3 frame
from a station that is not authenticated, it shall respond with a deauthentication
frame. If it receives a Class 3 frame from a station that is authenticated, but not
associated, it shall respond with a disassociation frame. Figure 2.2 shows the valid
transitions between the local states in 802.11.
Subsection 11.3.1.2 of the 802.11 standard [28] specifies how the destination STA
should handle 802.11 authentication requests:
Upon receipt of an Authentication frame with authentication transaction
sequence number equal to 1, the destination STA shall authenticate with
the indicated STA using the following procedure:
a) The STA shall execute the authentication mechanism described in
8.2.2.2.
b) If the authentication was successful, the state variable for the indi-
cated STA shall be set to State 2.
c) The STA shall issue an MLME-AUTHENTICATE.indication primi-
tive to inform the SME of the authentication.
Note that an open system authentication will always be successful, so an AP
that receives an open system authentication request will always enter State 2 (au-
thenticated, but not associated).
2.4.2 802.11i Security Amendments
802.11i introduces a new security framework: The Robust Security Network (RSN).
Authentication and key management in an RSN is carried out after the successful
completion of 802.11 authentication and association, as illustrated in figure 2.1.
However, some of the messages are modified. The beacon frames broadcast by the
AP and the probe response contain an RSN information element with the supported
security parameters. Cryptographic parameters are negotiated during the association
phase by including an RSN information element in the association request from
the station. If the security parameters are accepted by the AP, it enters State
3, and authentication is carried out using the Extensible Authentication Protocol
(EAP) [32]. EAP encapsulation over Local Area Networks (EAPOL), as specified in
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Figure 2.2: 802.11 state transitions. The authentication attack triggers a change
from State 3 to State 2 in the AP by transmitting a forged open system authentication
request. This transition is not shown in the state diagram, the only transition from
State 2 to State 3 is a disassociation notification, but it must be allowed to avoid
deadlocks when 802.11w is enabled.
IEEE 802.1X [33], is used to encapsulate the authentication messages in 802.11 data
frames. Figure 2.3 shows the authentication and key management in an RSN.
802.11i uses security associations (SAs) to store security policies and crypto-
graphic keys. There are two parts of the SA specifications that are relevant to the
vulnerabilities discussed in this paper: SA termination and recovery from lost key
state synchronization.
SA termination is triggered when an AP receives or transmits certain management
frames. If an AP receives a valid association or reassociation frame from a station,
it will delete the pairwise transient key SA (PTKSA), which contains the station’s
pairwise transient key. The PTKSA is also deleted if the AP sends or receives a
deauthentication or disassociation frame.
Loss of key state synchronization can occur if a station reboots and the temporal
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Figure 2.3: 802.11i RSN authentication and key management. Single lines represent
management frames, double lines represent data frames. Note that a deauthentication
attack will force the station to do the whole procedure over again, starting with
the authentication request. If pairwise master key security association (PMKSA)
caching is enabled, the 802.1X authentication does not have to be repeated.
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keys stored in memory are lost. A station that loses key state synchronization in an
ESS shall perform the deauthentication procedure before it sends an authentication
request. If the authentication and key management protocol (AKMP) fails between
a station and an AP that are associated, both the station and AP shall perform the
deauthentication procedure.
2.4.3 802.11w Protected Management Frames
802.11w uses CCMP from 802.11i to provide integrity, confidentiality and sender
authenticity for unicast management frames, and Broadcast Integrity Protocol (BIP)
to provide integrity for broadcast management frames. In both cases, protection
is only provided for management frames of subtype action, deauthentication and
disassociation. If protection of management frames is enabled and an unprotected
management frame of subtype action, deauthentication or disassociation is received,
the frame is silently discarded.
2.5 Vulnerability Analysis
2.5.1 General Observations
Meadows discusses several important principles for protocol design to minimize the
vulnerability to DoS attacks [4]. One of the fundamental principles is the following:
First of all, such a protocol must provide authentication from the very
beginning.
802.11 with the 802.11i and 802.11w amendments does not provide this, since
the 802.11 authentication and association procedures are carried out, unprotected,
before the 802.11i authentication is initiated. All of the messages exchanged prior to
the 802.11i authentication can thus be forged by an attacker. Of particular interest
are the messages that result in state transitions for the AP: authentication requests,
association requests, deauthentication notifications and disassociation notifications.
A successful authentication request will make the AP enter State 2. A successful
association request will make the AP enter State 3 if it is currently in State 2.
Deauthentication and disassociation notifications will make the AP enter State 1
or State 2, respectively. The 802.11w amendment provides integrity protection
for deauthentication and disassociation notifications, and in the latest drafts it
also provides a mechanism to avoid forged association requests. Authentication
requests, however, are not protected. Exploiting unprotected authentication requests
to perform a DoS attack against 802.11 with 802.11i and 802.11w is a principal
contribution of this paper.
2.5.2 The 802.11 Standard
802.11 deauthentication and disassociation DoS attacks are carried out by forging
a deauthentication or disassociation frame. The receiving station will change to
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State 1 for a deauthentication or State 2 for a disassociation. The most efficient of
these two is the deauthentication attack. If the station is deauthenticated, it has to
authenticate and associate to be able to send and receive traffic again. A slightly
more efficient approach is to deauthenticate the AP, which resets the AP to State 1.
The next data frame from the station will be dropped, the AP will respond with a
deauthentication notification, and the station will then authenticate and associate.
2.5.3 802.11i Security Amendments
802.11i significantly “improves” the efficiency of the deauthentication DoS attack.
Once a station has been deauthenticated, it must first perform 802.11 authentication
and association. Then, if enabled, 802.1X authentication must be carried out. 802.1X
authentication is not used with TKIP-PSK and CCMP-PSK, or when PMK caching
is enabled and a valid PMKSA exists between the AP and station. Finally, an
EAPOL 4-way handshake must be completed to derive the temporal keys. Once the
4-way handshake is completed, the station can send and receive traffic.
The SA termination procedures in 802.11i make an even more efficient DoS attack
possible. If an attacker sends a forged association or reassociation frame from the
station to the AP, the AP will remain in State 3, but the temporal keys will be
deleted. The AP will start the EAPOL 4-way handshake, which will eventually time
out, then deauthenticate the station, resulting in the procedure described in the
previous paragraph.
2.5.4 802.11w Protected Management Frames
802.11w prevents the deauthentication and disassociation attacks. However, the effect
of the SA termination attack is amplified. When the EAPOL 4-way handshake times
out, the AP will try to deauthenticate the station. Since the pairwise keys in the AP
are deleted, the deauthentication frame will not be protected, and thus discarded by
the station. The station will not be able to send or receive any traffic, and is not able
to recover, since it discards the deauthentication frames from the AP. An attempt
to fix this vulnerability is included in draft version 4.0 and later of 802.11w, where a
cryptographically protected SA Query procedure is used to determine whether or not
an association or reassociation frame from the station is legitimate. Implementations
based on draft 3.0 or earlier, however, are still vulnerable to the SA termination
attack.
The SA Query procedure works as follows: if an AP receives an association
request from a station with which it has a valid PTKSA, the AP responds that the
association request was temporarily rejected. This response tells the station how
long it has to wait before it can send another association request. Then, the AP
tries to send one or more query messages to the station to check if it has a valid
PTKSA. The queries are management action frames protected under the current
PTKSA. If a valid response to one of these queries is received, the association request
is ignored. If no response is received before the timeout value is reached, the AP will
delete the PTKSA. A station that loses key state synchronization will thus have to
send an association request, wait until the query procedure times out, then send a
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new association request. The number of queries and timeout value are configurable
parameters.
Another issue with 802.11w is that the recovery procedure for lost key state
synchronization in 802.11i is no longer possible, since a station that loses synchro-
nization will not be able to send a protected deauthentication frame to the AP.
To recover, a station has to start 802.11 authentication without first performing a
deauthentication, and the AP has to allow this to avoid a deadlock. This can be
exploited to enable a new kind of DoS attack against 802.11: The attacker transmits
a forged open system authentication frame, which will make the AP enter State 2.
The AP still has a valid PTKSA with the station, so once the station transmits a
data frame, the AP responds with a protected disassociation frame. The end result
is the same as if a disassociation attack had been carried out. This type of attack
will from now on be referred to as an “authentication attack”.
2.6 Experiments
The goals of the experiments were to verify the feasability of the authentication
and SA termination DoS attacks, and to verify that 802.11w protects against the
deauthentication attack. To this end, the authentication, SA termination and deau-
thentication attacks were performed both with 802.11w enabled and disabled, for a
total of six experiments. Each attack was performed 100 times to ensure that the
results were consistent.
2.6.1 Infrastructure Set-Up
The infrastructure under attack consisted of a Cisco 4402 wireless controller (AIR-
WLC4402-25-K9) and a Cisco 1030 access point (AIR-AP-1030). Both the wireless
controller and access point were running software version 4.2.61.0 with Cisco Man-
agement Frame Protection (MFP) based on an earlier 802.11w revision than draft
3.0. 802.11i CCMP-PSK was used for all the experiments. The wireless controller
and AP were configured to reject shared key authentication, and CCMP-PSK was
required, which means that association requests without an RSN information element
were rejected. The station was a laptop computer with a Cisco Aironet 802.11 a/b/g
network adapter (AIR-CB21AG-E-K9), running Windows XP SP2. The station was
assigned an IPv4 address through DHCP from the wireless controller. Both the AP
and station used 802.11g for the experiments. The attacker was a laptop with a
wireless network interface card (NIC) with the Atheros AR2413 chipset, running
Linux 2.6.22 with the madwifi-ng drivers, and aircrack-ng [27] version 0.9.1 as the
attack software. In particular, airmon-ng was used to enable RFMON (monitor)
mode, aireplay-ng and airtun-ng were used to inject frames, and airodump-ng to
capture traffic. The same wireless network interface was used for frame injection and
traffic capture, and the experiments were conducted in a typical office environment,
with no shielding from other wireless stations and APs nearby. The only legitimate
traffic on the wireless network was an Internet Control Message Protocol (ICMP)
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ECHO request from the station to a server on the wired LAN every second, and an
ICMP ECHO request from the server to the station every second, along with the
ICMP ECHO responses. The ping commands in Windows XP and Linux were used
to generate traffic from the station and server, respectively.
2.6.2 Attacks
The attacks were carried out by transmitting a single management frame of subtype
authentication request, association request or deauthentication. To ensure that only
one frame was transmitted, an attack tool was used to generate the frame, which was
captured using airodump-ng. The single frame was then saved to a file and replayed
using airtun-ng.
First, the aireplay-ng tool was used to generate an authentication request frame,
with the two-byte authentication algorithm field set to “Open System” (0x0000).
Then, an association request frame containing an RSN information element with
CCMP support, which would be accepted by the AP, was obtained by running an
authentication attack and recording the subsequent association request transmitted
by the station. It is also possible for an attacker to construct a valid association
frame from the information contained in the beacon frames broadcast from the AP.
The authentication request and association request frames were constructed with
the station MAC address as source and the AP MAC address as destination. Last,
the aireplay-ng tool was used to construct a deauthentication frame with the AP
MAC address as source and the station MAC address as destination.
Once the attack frames were generated, the experiments were performed by
transmitting an attack frame once, then waiting for the station to regain connectivity.
Once the station was back on-line, a new attack was launched, and this was repeated
until a total of 100 attacks of each type had been carried out. All 802.11 frames to
and from the AP were recorded for analysis.
2.6.3 Observations
Several significant results were observed while conducting the experiments.
First, as expected, the deauthentication attack did not work when MFP was
enabled, but did work as expected when disabled.
Second, the authentication attack worked, both with and without MFP enabled.
The station lost its network connection and had to reconnect.
Third, the valid association attack resulted in a permanent DoS when MFP was
enabled. After excessive timeouts, the station interface was automatically assigned a
link-local IPv4 address (169.254/16 prefix), and manual intervention was needed to
get it back on-line.
2.6.4 Results
Once the experiments were completed, Wireshark [34] version 0.99.6 was used to
analyze the results.
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Figure 2.4: Expected and observed results for the deauthentication attack with
MFP disabled. The attack had no effect when MFP was enabled.
Deauthentication Attack
The deauthentication attack worked as expected. Figure 2.4 shows the expected and
observed results when MFP was disabled. With MFP enabled, the attack had no
effect, since the deauthentication notification was ignored by the station.
Authentication Attack
The results of the authentication attack were slightly different from the expected
results. Figure 2.5 shows how the attack would work on an implementation that
conforms to the standard.
The only difference between the expected and observed results were that the
AP responded with a deauthentication notification when it should have used a
disassociation notification. Figure 2.6 shows the observed results with MFP enabled.
With MFP disabled, the only difference was that the deauthentication notification
was not protected. The reason code in the deauthentication notification frame was
“Class 3 frame received from nonassociated station (0x0007)”, which confirms that
the AP was in State 1 or 2 immediately after the attack.
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Figure 2.5: Expected results for the authentication attack. The only difference
between MFP enabled and disabled was that in the former case the disassociation
notification was protected.
SA Termination Attack
The results of the SA termination attacks were also as expected. Figure 2.7 shows
the expected and observed results with MFP disabled. One interesting observation is
that this attack is more efficient than any other known MAC layer DoS attack against
802.11 when RSN is enabled. In the experiment, the AP sent the first message of
the EAPOL 4-way handshake, then waited for one second before retrying. This
was repeated three times before the AKMP failed. The SA termination attach thus
added three more seconds of downtime compared to the deauthentication attack.
Figure 2.8 shows the expected and observed results with MFP enabled. The
station did not accept unprotected deauthentication notifications from the AP. The
end result was a deadlock, with manual intervention required to get the station
reconnected.
2.7 Discussion
The results from the theoretical analysis and the experiments in the previous sections
show that a network using 802.11w is vulnerable to the authentication attack. This
attack has the same efficiency and feasability as a disassociation attack. 802.11w thus
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Figure 2.6: Observed results for the authentication attack with MFP enabled.
The AP responds with a deauthentication notification when it should have used a
disassociation notification.
fails to protect against all DoS attacks that are equivalent to the deauthentication
and disassociation attacks.
Introducing protected deauthentication and disassociation frames in 802.11w
leads to a deadlock vulnerability. If the PTKSA in the AP is deleted while the
station still has a valid PTKSA, then the station is not able to recover. This is the
result of the SA termination attack. The proposed solution to this vulnerability by
TGw is the SA Query procedure. This procedure has a weakness: an attacker who
is able to delete messages or perform radio frequency (RF) jamming attacks will
still be able to create a deadlock by sending an association request, then deleting
the SA queries or perform RF jamming until the SA Query procedure times out.
Message deletion in 802.11 networks is possible in the following way: the attacker
listens for messages, then switches on the transmitter while the message is in transit
to create a collision. Immediately after the collision, the attacker sends a MAC layer
acknowledgment (ACK) to the sender. The sender thus assumes that the message
was received, and no retransmission occurs. RF jamming attacks are even easier to
perform. Since the association response from the AP contains the timeout value,
the attacker knows exactly how long the jamming attack must last to result in a
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Figure 2.7: Expected and observed results for the SA termination attack with MFP
disabled. The failed 4-way handshake adds three seconds of downtime compared to
a deauthentication attack.
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Figure 2.8: Expected and observed results for the SA termination attack with
MFP enabled. The result is a deadlock.
deadlock. The 802.11w drafts suggest a timeout value of around one second. An
attacker can thus spend one second of RF jamming to permanently disconnect the
station.
2.8 Proposal for a Robust Solution
The root cause of the DoS vulnerabilities in 802.11, both the previously known ones
and the new vulnerability presented in this paper, is that 802.11 with amendments
does not adhere to the first principle from [4]. The proposed solution adheres to
this principle: To provide authentication from the very beginning. The challenge is
how to do it, given the existing 802.11 standard with amendments. The creators of
WEP did one thing right, their shared key authentication was performed as early
as possible. This authentication, as well as the 802.11 open system authentication,
is carried out using management frames of subtype authentication. Such frames
have an important property, they contain an “Authentication Algorithm Number”
field with a length of two bytes. Currently, only the values “0” (open system) and
“1” (shared key) are used. This means that it is possible to add identifiers for new
authentication methods.
Figure 2.9 shows the proposed authentication and key management procedure.
The new authentication frame specification is the following: Add a new authentication
algorithm number, “2”, for RSN authentication. Add an RSN information element
(security parameters) to the authentication frame. This enables the station to specify
the authentication method and security parameters to be used in the authentication
request.
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The remaining issue is how to encapsulate the EAPOL messages used for au-
thentication. This is solved by adding a new management frame subtype of Class
1, “authentication and key management”. To remove all of the DoS vulnerabilities
described in this paper, the 802.11i EAPOL authentication and key exchange mes-
sages are encapsulated in the authentication and key management frames, rather
than in data frames. 802.11w should then be amended to also provide protection for
authentication and key management, association request and association response
frames. Note that for backwards compatibility, the use of data frames to transport
EAPOL messages must still be supported as defined in 802.11i.
Finally, to avoid deadlocks, the PTKSA should not be terminated after a successful
association, disassociation or deauthentication, but rather be replaced with a new
PTKSA after a successful 4-way handshake. If the protected association procedure
fails, both the station and AP should perform the deauthentication procedure.
The construction outlined above can be backwards compatible with 802.11 with
amendments, as noted. However, as long as backwards compatibility is preserved, the
network will still be vulnerable to the authentication attack described in subsection
2.5.4. A transitional workaround for this is that the AP maintains a list of stations
that have been successfully authenticated using the new authentication method, and
that authentication requests for open system or shared key authentication for these
stations are ignored. If backwards compatibility is discarded, this is not an issue,
since an attacker will not be able to successfully authenticate.
2.9 Conclusions
All of the attacks presented in this paper were carried out using off the shelf hardware
and freely available software. No software or hardware modification was necessary,
so any person with access to a laptop computer and an Internet connection should
be able to replicate these experiments or carry out actual DoS attacks.
Although the SA termination vulnerability from forged association frames has
been addressed in recent draft versions of 802.11w, implementations of early drafts
are still vulnerable. Until these have been updated, a network with 802.11w enabled
is more vulnerable to DoS than a network without. Since the only purpose of 802.11w
at the moment is to protect against DoS, a sound recommendation would be to
disable it until a solution for this vulnerability is provided.
The SA Query procedure proposed as a solution to the SA termination vulnera-
bility does not protect against an attacker who is able to delete messages or perform
RF jamming attacks. Due to the severity of this vulnerability, the author strongly
recommends that a more robust solution, such as the one proposed in section 2.8, is
adopted.
The 802.11w drafts do not, as far as the author is aware of, address the authenti-
cation attack of subsection 2.5.4. If protection against all DoS attacks with efficiency
and feasability equivalent to the disassociation attack is a goal of TGw, the proposed
solution from this paper should be included in the 802.11w amendment.
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Figure 2.9: The proposed solution for RSN authentication and key management.
The authentication procedure is initiated when the station transmits an authen-
tication frame with authentication algorithm number equal to 2 and a valid RSN
information element. Management frames of subtype “authentication and key man-
agement” are used to encapsulate the 802.1X authentication messages, the 4-way
handshake and the group key handshake. Note that the association request and
response are protected.
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Abstract
This paper proposes a highly efficient cryptographic denial of service
attack against 802.11 networks using 802.11i TKIP and CCMP. The attacker
captures one frame, then modifies and transmits it twice to disrupt network
access for 60 seconds. We analyze, implement and experimentally validate the
attack. We also propose a robust solution and recommendations for network
administrators.
3.1 Introduction
IEEE 802.11 is a standard for wireless local area networks1 [28]. The 802.11i
amendment to the standard specifies the robust security network (RSN) [29]. An
RSN supports two security mechanisms, the temporal key integrity protocol (TKIP)
and counter mode with cipher block chaining message authentication code protocol
(CCMP).
TKIP was designed to be backward compatible with existing hardware, which
put computational constraints on the message integrity code (MIC) algorithm. The
TKIP MIC is vulnerable to attacks due to these constraints. Countermeasures were
thus introduced to detect and respond to attacks. If two TKIP MIC failures are
detected within 60 seconds, all security associations using TKIP are terminated and
the negotiation of new security associations using TKIP is disabled for 60 seconds.
The intended long term security mechanism for 802.11 networks, CCMP, has
strong confidentiality and integrity protection. CCMP does not use countermeasures
to compensate for vulnerabilities. The most common default configuration for 802.11
access points (APs) using 802.11i is to support both TKIP and CCMP. This provides
backward compatibility, as well as a stronger security mechanism for clients that
support it.
802.11 has been extensively used during the last decade in computers, mobile
phones, wireless security cameras and vehicular communication systems. 802.11
networks are thus attractive targets for adversaries that seek to disrupt communi-
cations through the use of denial of service (DoS) attacks. An attacker could use
physical layer jamming to disrupt a wireless network. In a typical jamming attack the
attacker transmits continuously. A distributed intrusion detection system can locate
the attacker by measuring the received signal strength on multiple sensors. More
sophisticated and efficient attacks target the 802.11 medium access control (MAC)
layer. A common MAC layer attack is the deauthentication attack from Bellardo
and Savage [5]. Transmitting a deauthentication frame, which takes less than 100
microseconds, disrupts a network using 802.11i for approximately 1 second [35]. The
deauthentication attack is far more efficient than physical layer jamming. In general,
the higher the efficiency of the attack, the more difficult it is to locate the attacker.
Vulnerabilities that can be exploited by highly efficient DoS attacks should be found
and amended.
1In this paper, “network” is a synonym for a “basic service set” (BSS) in 802.11.
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The motivation of this work is to make 802.11 more resilient to DoS attacks by
finding and amending the abovementioned vulnerabilities. This paper makes five
principal contributions. First, we analyze the 802.11 standard and discover a highly
efficient cryptographic DoS attack. Second, we show that the attack also works
against clients using CCMP as the pairwise cipher in networks that support both
TKIP and CCMP. Third, we demonstrate that the attack works even if 802.11e
quality of service (QoS) support is disabled in the AP. Fourth, we implement the
attack and experimentally validate the analytical results. Fifth, we propose a robust
solution to the vulnerability and temporary measures to limit the exposure to the
vulnerability.
A more general lesson from this work is the connection between the cryptographic
protocol design and network availability. Information and network security was
traditionally categorized as confidentiality, integrity and availability. In the case
of TKIP, availability was intentionally put at risk to improve the integrity of the
protocol. Later changes to the protocol resulted in a severe DoS vulnerability, and
design flaws even put clients using newer security mechanisms at risk. The use
of formal methods, models and tools to analyze the confidentiality and integrity
properties of cryptographic protocols is a well developed field of research, but this is
not the case for availability. The development of formal methods, models and tools
for the analysis of availability in cryptographic protocols might help future protocol
designers construct more robust protocols.
The rest of this paper is structured as follows. Section 3.2 reviews related work.
In Section 3.3, we present relevant parts of the 802.11 standard and a vulnerability
analysis. Section 3.4 provides the attack implementation. Section 3.5 presents the
experimental setup, and Section 3.6 contains the results. In Section 3.7, we discuss
the results, propose a solution, and provide recommendations for wireless network
administrators. Section 3.8 concludes the work.
3.2 Related Work
Researchers have discovered several DoS vulnerabilities in the 802.11 standard. An
early paper on this topic by Bellardo and Savage demonstrated that DoS attacks
were practical [5]. In the years after the publication of this paper, such attacks
have become much easier to carry out due to readily available software such as the
aircrack-ng tool suite [27] and the driver support for 802.11 monitor mode and frame
injection.
One of the most widely implemented DoS attacks against 802.11 is the deauthen-
tication attack [5], which disconnects a client2 by transmitting one deauthentication
frame. Figure 3.4 in Appendix 3.A illustrates the attack. When 802.11i is used,
eight frames must be exchanged between the access point (AP) and the client before
it is reconnected. Aime et al. performed measurements of the efficiency of the
deauthentication attack, and concluded that transmitting one frame per second was
sufficient to completely block the wireless channel in a network using 802.11i [35].
2In this paper, “client” is a synonym for a “non-AP station” (STA) in 802.11.
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Smith mentioned that there are a number of challenges associated with deliberately
invoking the TKIP countermeasures [11, Ch. 6]. He concluded that other DoS attacks
against 802.11 were likely easier to mount.
Glass and Muthukkumarasamy published experimental results of a DoS attack
in 2007 [36]. The TKIP countermeasures were invoked using a man-in-the-middle
technique. They showed that it is possible to mount such an attack in a laboratory
environment, but difficult to consistently establish the attacker as a man-in-the-
middle between the client and AP. The reason for this difficulty is that the attacker
has to compete with the legitimate AP. Since 802.11 uses a wireless broadcast
medium, the client will receive messages from both the attacker and the AP, and
might choose to connect to the AP rather than the attacker.
Beck and Tews published the first partial key recovery attack against TKIP in
2009 [37]. One of their key observations was that the QoS mechanisms introduced in
802.11e [38] made replay attacks against TKIP possible.
Halvorsen et al. proposed that the attack from Beck and Tews could be used
as a cryptographic DoS attack [39] . The attacker has to transmit 129 frames on
average to cause the network to shut down for 60 seconds. This attack is less efficient
than the deauthentication attack, since the attacker has to transmit more than two
frames to cause one second of disruption. The authors assumed that the 802.11e
QoS features had to be enabled in the AP for the attack to work.
Ko¨nings et al. published two new DoS attacks against 802.11 in 2009 [40]. The
attacks exploit the channel switch and channel assessment mechanisms of 802.11h [41].
Their paper also provides an overview and classification of previous DoS attacks
against 802.11. With regards to DoS attacks invoking TKIP countermeasures, they
only mention the paper by Glass and Muthukkumarasamy [36].
3.3 Vulnerability Analysis
Some background material from 802.11 is required to analyze the TKIP DoS vulner-
ability. Only the most relevant parts are covered in this paper, see 802.11-2007 [28]
for more details.
3.3.1 TKIP and 802.11e
TKIP provides confidentiality and integrity for 802.11 networks by the use of the
stream cipher RC4 and the message integrity code (MIC) Michael. The input values
to the MIC are the plaintext data, destination address, source address and QoS
priority. TKIP generates a new RC4 key for each frame, using a key mixing function.
The input values to the key mixing function are the temporal key currently in use, the
transmitter’s address and the TKIP sequence counter (TSC), a 48-bit monotonically
increasing counter. To construct a frame, the MIC is appended to the data, then an
integrity check value (ICV) is computed over the data and MIC. TKIP uses a 32-bit
cyclic redundancy check (CRC-32) to compute the ICV. Finally, the data, MIC and
ICV are encrypted by computing a bitwise XOR with the key stream generated by
RC4. Figure 3.5 in Appendix 3.B illustrates the structure of a TKIP frame.
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Figure 3.1: The 802.11 MAC frame [28]
The TSC is used to prevent replay attacks. If a frame is received with a TSC
value that is equal to or less than the previous value seen, then this frame is discarded.
This posed a problem when the QoS mechanisms in 802.11e were introduced. With
802.11e, frames may be transmitted out of order due to different priorities. For
example, a frame carrying voice traffic may be transmitted before a frame carrying
data from a file transfer, even though the voice frame has a higher TSC. To avoid
legitimate frames being dropped, 802.11e introduced a separate TSC for each QoS
priority at the receiver. The QoS priority is an integer value stored in the QoS
Control field of the medium access control (MAC) header in 802.11, as illustrated in
Figure 3.1. 802.11e defines 8 priority classes (0-7).
The wireless multimedia (WMM) specification from the Wi-Fi Alliance, based
on 802.11e, defines 4 priority classes (0-3). The QoS Control field is only present in
QoS frames. To determine if a frame has a QoS Control field, the receiver inspects
the frame type and subtype in the Frame Control field of the MAC header.
The MIC used in TKIP is vulnerable to forgery attacks with a complexity of
O(220) [42]. To compensate for this, TKIP uses countermeasures to detect and
respond to attacks. All MIC failures at the AP and clients are recorded. If a
client experiences a MIC failure, it sends an integrity protected failure report to the
AP. If two or more MIC failures or failure reports are observed within 60 seconds,
countermeasures are invoked. The countermeasures are to terminate all security
associations using TKIP, and to refuse any new security associations using TKIP for
60 seconds. An attacker is thus limited to one MIC forgery attempt per minute.
The designers of TKIP tried to make it difficult to deliberately invoke the
countermeasures. The TSC and ICV are checked before the MIC. If either fail, then
the frame is discarded and the MIC is not checked. If an attacker changes the TSC,
then the encryption key of the RC4 cipher is also changed, so the encrypted ICV
would decrypt incorrectly. However, the changes made by 802.11e makes it possible
to perform countermeasures based DoS attacks against TKIP. The QoS priority is
one of the input values to the MIC, but not to the key mixing function or ICV. If the
QoS priority is changed, then the MIC is invalid, but the ICV remains valid. The
TSC of the new frame will be checked against the TSC for the new priority. Since a
transmitter uses a single, monotonically increasing TSC counter, it is highly probable
that the receiver will accept the TSC of a frame that has its QoS priority modified
before it is retransmitted. To perform the DoS attack, the attacker captures traffic.
When a QoS TKIP frame is observed, the attacker modifies the QoS priority and
retransmits the frame twice. The receiver then invokes countermeasures, resulting in
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Figure 3.2: The RSN information element [28]
at least 60 seconds of downtime.
3.3.2 TKIP and CCMP
As mentioned in the introduction, the most common AP configuration is to allow
both TKIP and CCMP. 802.11i specifies two temporal security associations between
an AP and a client. The pairwise transient key security association (PTKSA) protects
unicast traffic using a pairwise transient key (PTK). The group transient key security
association (GTKSA) protects broadcast and multicast traffic from the AP to clients
using a group transient key (GTK). When a client transmits a broadcast or multicast
frame, it is protected by the PTK. The frame is decrypted by the AP, encrypted
with the GTK, and transmitted to the wireless network. According to Section 9.2.7
of 802.11, clients should discard broadcast and multicast frames that have their own
address as the source address [28].
The RSN information element (IE), present in frames of subtype beacon, probe
response, association request and reassociation request, contains information about
the security mechanisms supported by the transmitter. Figure 3.2 illustrates the
RSN IE. The RSN IE supports multiple pairwise cipher suites, but only one group
cipher suite. A network that supports both TKIP and CCMP has to use TKIP as
the group cipher suite for all clients.
Knowing that CCMP clients use TKIP as the group cipher suite in networks that
support both TKIP and CCMP, one might ask what happens if MIC failures occur
on broadcast or multicast frames. Section 8.3.2.4 of 802.11 provides the answer [28]:
The number of MIC failures is accrued independent of the particular
key context. Any single MIC failure, whether detected by the Supplicant
or the Authenticator and whether resulting from a group MIC key failure
or a pairwise MIC key failure, shall be treated as cause for a MIC failure
event.
[...]
If less than 60 s have passed since the most recent previous MIC
failure, delete the PTKSA and GTKSA. Deauthenticate from the AP
and wait for 60 s before (re)establishing a TKIP association with the
same AP. A TKIP association is any IEEE 802.11 association that uses
TKIP for its pairwise or group cipher suite.
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To make the DoS attack work against clients using CCMP, the attacker waits for a
broadcast or multicast frame from the AP. The attack is then carried out as described
in Subsection 3.3.1. This attack works even if none of the clients use TKIP as the
pairwise cipher suite. A side effect of such an attack is that the AP also invokes
countermeasures due to the MIC failure reports received from the clients.
One might ask what happens to new security associations using CCMP as the
pairwise cipher when the AP invokes countermeasures. Section 8.3.2.4.1 of 802.11
specifies the AP behavior as follows [28]:
If less than 60 s have passed since the most recent previous MIC
failure, the Authenticator shall deauthenticate and delet all PTKSAs for
all STAs using TKIP. If the current GTKSA uses TKIP, that GTKSA
shall be discarded, and a new GTKSA constructed, but not used for
60 s. The Authenticator shall refuse the construction of new PTKSAs
using TKIP as one or more of the ciphers for 60 s. At the end of this
period, the MIC failure counter and timer shall be reset, and creation of
PTKSAs accepted as usual.
The statement “PTKSAs using TKIP as one or more of the ciphers” contradicts the
definition of a PTKSA, which contains only one cipher. If the term “PTKSA” in
this context is interpreted to mean “SA”, then the statement is consistent with the
rest of the standard. Such an interpretation implies that clients using CCMP as
the pairwise cipher and TKIP as the group cipher will not be allowed to connect to
the AP while countermeasures are in effect. As will be shown in Section 3.6, the
experimental results support this interpretation.
3.3.3 Networks Without 802.11e QoS Support
Since the attack relies on 802.11e QoS support, one might ask what happens if QoS
support is disabled in the AP. 802.11 is vague on this point, but Section 6.1.1.2
provides a partial answer [28]:
At QoS STAs associated in a QoS BSS, MSDUs with a priority of
Contention are considered equivalent to MSDUs with TID 0, and those
with a priority of ContentionFree are delivered using the contention-free
delivery if a point coordinator (PC) is present in the AP. If a PC is
not present, MSDUs with a priority of ContentionFree shall be delivered
using an UP of 0. At STAs associated in a non-QoS BSS, all MSDUs with
an integer priority are considered equivalent to MSDUs with a priority
of Contention.
The last sentence implies that clients should accept QoS frames even if associated in
a network that does not support QoS. The key word in this sentence is “equivalent”,
which is open to interpretation. If it means that the integer priority is used as input
to the TKIP MIC, then the attack works even if QoS is disabled in the AP, as long
as the priority is not equal to 0. As will be shown in Section 3.6, the experimental
results support this interpretation. To convert a regular data frame to a QoS frame,
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an attacker has to flip one bit in the Frame Control field and insert a two byte long
QoS Control field.
3.3.4 Analysis Summary
Invoking the TKIP countermeasures is easy due to the modifications in 802.11e. An
attacker captures a broadcast or multicast frame from the AP, then modifies the
QoS priority and retransmits the frame twice. Figure 3.3 in Appendix 3.A illustrates
the attack. The attacker does not need to prevent the reception of the original frame
at the clients. The attack is a simple retransmission of a modified frame, and does
not use a man-in-the-middle technique. Since the frame is a broadcast frame, all
clients except the one that transmitted the frame will invoke countermeasures. The
AP will also invoke countermeasures due to the MIC failure reports from the clients.
If the frame is not a QoS frame, the attacker flips one bit in the MAC header and
inserts the QoS Control field. The attack also works against clients that use CCMP
as the pairwise cipher. Furthermore, the attack only relies on QoS support in the
clients. Disabling QoS support in the AP does not prevent the DoS attack.
3.4 Implementation
The aircrack-ng [27] tool suite was used as a framework for the vulnerability as-
sessment tool implementation. The implementation depends on a wireless network
interface card with driver support for 802.11 monitor mode and frame injection.
Network interface cards with the Atheros AR2413 and AR5001X+ chipsets were
used as the attacker in the experiments. The driver used was the Linux ath5k driver.
A network interface card with the Intel 3945ABG chipset was tested, but not usable
as the attacker because it replaced the source MAC address of all transmitted frames
with the MAC address of the network interface card. The implementation listens
for a TKIP frame using 802.11 monitor mode, then modifies and retransmits the
frame to invoke the TKIP countermeasures. The source code for the modification
and retransmission of frames is included in Appendix 3.C.
Run-time configuration of several attack parameters is supported to make the
vulnerability assessment tool more flexible. The default behavior is to listen for
TKIP frames from the AP, and then perform the attack. The run-time options for
the vulnerability assessment tool, tkipdos-ng, are included in Appendix 3.D.
To give wireless network administrators the opportunity to test the vulnerability
of their networks, tkipdos-ng will be made available as free software licensed under
the GNU General Public License version 2.
3.5 Experimental Validation
Based on the analysis in Section 3.3, several vulnerability tests were constructed to
validate the theoretical analysis on a wide array of different products. The hypotheses
and experimental design are detailed in this section. The hypotheses to be tested
were as follows:
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1. Converting a non-QoS TKIP frame into a QoS TKIP frame with priority 1,
2 or 3 will cause a MIC failure in clients with QoS support even if QoS is
disabled in the AP
2. Clients using CCMP as the pairwise cipher and TKIP as the group cipher will
invoke countermeasures if they experience two TKIP MIC failures within a 60
second time period
3. Clients using CCMP as the pairwise cipher and TKIP as the group cipher
will not connect to an AP if TKIP countermeasures in the client are currently
active for that AP
4. Clients using CCMP as the pairwise cipher and TKIP as the group cipher will
not be able to establish a connection to an AP with active countermeasures
To test the hypotheses, two experiments were designed. The first experiment tests
hypotheses 1, 2 and 3. An AP is configured with support for both TKIP and CCMP.
QoS and TKIP countermeasures are disabled in the AP. Two clients connect to the
AP using CCMP as the pairwise cipher suite. The attacker listens for broadcast or
multicast TKIP frames from the AP. When such a frame is observed, the attacker
converts the frame to a QoS frame with priority 1, 2 or 3 and retransmits the frame
twice. The attacker then observes the effect on the client that did not transmit the
original broadcast frame. Since TKIP countermeasures are disabled in the AP, this
experiment isolates the effect of MIC failures in the client. If hypotheses 1, 2 and 3
are true, then the client invokes countermeasures and will not be able to reconnect
to the AP for at least 60 seconds.
The second experiment tests hypothesis 4. An AP is configured with support
for both TKIP and CCMP. QoS and TKIP countermeasures are enabled in the AP.
A client connects to the AP using TKIP as the pairwise cipher suite. The attacker
listens for TKIP frames from the client to the AP. When such a frame is observed,
the attacker converts the frame to a QoS frame if it is non-QoS, changes the frame
priority to 1, 2 or 3 and retransmits the frame twice. The attacker then observes
the effect on the AP. If the AP has invoked countermeasures, a client using CCMP
as the pairwise cipher suite tries to connect to the AP. If hypothesis 4 is true, the
client using CCMP should not be able to connect to the AP for at least 60 seconds
after the countermeasures were invoked.
3.6 Results
The first experiment was performed with different clients to test whether the vul-
nerabilities were general or implementation specific. A Linksys WRT54GL wireless
router with the OpenWrt [43] Kamikaze r19286 firmware was used as the AP. The
hostapd [44] implementation in the firmware was modified so that it did not invoke
TKIP countermeasures. The clients were configured to use CCMP as the pairwise
cipher suite. The clients used for the experiment and the results are listed in Table
3.1. All of the clients that supported 802.11e QoS were vulnerable to the attack.
Transmitting two modified broadcast or multicast frames from the attacker invoked
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Hardware Operating System QoS Support Vulnerable
Apple iMac 11.1 Mac OSX 10.6.2 Yes Yes
Apple iPhone iPhone OS No No
Apple iPhone 3G iPhone OS No No
Asus EEE 901 Mandriva Linux 2010.0 Yes Yes
Compaq 8510p Windows Vista Ultimate Yes Yes
Compaq CQ60 Windows Vista Home Basic Yes Yes
Dell Latitude D620 Windows XP Yes Yes
Dell Latitude D630 Fedora Linux 11 Yes Yes
Dell Latitude E4200 Windows 7 Yes Yes
HTC Hero Google Android Yes Yes
HTC S710 Windows Mobile 6 Yes Yes
Nokia N810 Maemo Linux 4 Yes Yes
Nokia N900 Maemo Linux 5 No No
Table 3.1: Equipment used in the first experiment. All 802.11e QoS supported
clients were vulnerable to the DoS attack.
Hardware Firmware Vulnerable
Cisco 1242AG 4.1.192.35M Yes
Linksys WRT54GL Linksys 4.30.13 Yes
Linksys WRT54GL OpenWrt 8.09.2 [43] Yes
Linksys WRT54GL Tomato 1.27 [45] Yes
Netgear WNR1000 V1.0.1.5 Yes
Table 3.2: APs used in the second experiment. All of the APs refused to establish
new connections using CCMP as the pairwise cipher and TKIP as the group cipher
while the attack countermeasures were active.
countermeasures on all the clients, and caused the clients to send MIC failure notifi-
cations to the AP. The clients were unable to establish a new connection to the AP
for 60 seconds.
The second experiment was performed with different APs to test whether the
vulnerabilities were general or implementation specific. The APs used for the experi-
ment and the results are listed in Table 3.2. Once the AP invoked countermeasures,
both clients using CCMP and clients using TKIP as the pairwise cipher suite were
unable to establish a new connection for 60 seconds.
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3.7 Discussion
The test results confirmed all of the interpretations in Section 3.3. Networks that
support both TKIP and CCMP are vulnerable to DoS attacks that invoke the
TKIP countermeasures, and such attacks cause all clients to be disconnected for 60
seconds. Disabling QoS support on the AP does not prevent an attack against the
clients. Furthermore, as long as at least one associated client supports QoS, the
attack will cause it to send MIC failure notifications to the AP. The AP will invoke
countermeasures and disconnect all clients, including those that do not support QoS.
Since this cryptographic DoS attack only affects networks using 802.11i, it could
be used as a security rollback attack. When the attack is mounted, networks
using weaker security mechanisms are functional, while networks using 802.11i are
disrupted.
During the experiments, we observed that once clients reconnected after the 60
seconds of downtime, they transmitted several broadcast frames. The client operating
systems used the Address Resolution Protocol (ARP) [46] and the Dynamic Host
Configuration Protocol (DHCP) [47] to establish Internet Protocol (IP) connectivity.
These protocols use broadcast messages that could be captured, modified and
retransmitted as a new attack. Once the countermeasures were deactivated, a new
attack immediately invoked the countermeasures again.
The vulnerability presented in this paper can be removed by modifying TKIP. If
the QoS priority is used as input to the TKIP key mixing function, then a modified
priority will result in a different RC4 key stream. A modified frame would then be
rejected by the recipient due to a failed ICV check.
A network administrator could split a network that supports TKIP and CCMP
into two logical networks to reduce the exposure to the vulnerability. One network
would support TKIP only and the other would support CCMP only. This approach
guarantees that attacks against TKIP do not affect clients using CCMP.
Another partial solution is to prevent broadcast and multicast traffic from the
AP. By default, the Cisco Unified Wireless Network design [48] is configured so that
the AP does not transmit any broadcast or multicast frames on the wireless network.
As long as none of the clients use TKIP as the pairwise cipher suite, the attack does
not work against such networks.
3.8 Conclusions
The DoS attack described in this paper is practical, easy to implement, and can be
mounted using off the shelf hardware and readily available software. Transmitting
two modified frames disrupts a TKIP/CCMP-based 802.11 network for 60 seconds.
It is one of the most efficient known DoS attacks against 802.11. The attack works
even if all clients use CCMP as the pairwise cipher and QoS support is disabled in the
AP. There are several ways to mitigate or prevent the attack, and recommendations
are given in Section 3.7.
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3.A Message Sequence Diagrams
Figure 3.3: The cryptographic DoS attack against clients using CCMP as the pair-
wise cipher suite. Two transmitted frames from the attacker invokes countermeasures
in all clients except the originator of the broadcast frame. Countermeasures are also
invoked in the AP due to the MIC failure reports from the clients.
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3.B. TKIP Frame Structure
Figure 3.4: The deauthentication attack against a client using 802.11i
3.B TKIP Frame Structure
Figure 3.5: An 802.11 TKIP frame [28]
3.C Vulnerability Assessment Tool Source Code
qos = 0;
// z = MAC header length
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z = ( ( h80211[1] & 3 ) != 3 ) ? 24 : 30;
if ( ( h80211[0] & 0x80 ) == 0x80 )
{
qos = 1;
z += 2;
}
if(qos == 0) // If the frame does not have a QoS Control
// field then insert one
{
// QoS data
h80211[0] |= 0x80;
// Move frame body 2 bytes to the right
// to make room for QoS control field
for(i=caplen+1; i>z+1; i--)
h80211[i] = h80211[i-2];
// Add 2 bytes QoS control field
caplen += 2;
h80211[24] = 0x00;
h80211[25] = 0x00;
}
// QoS priority (TID)
tid = h80211[24] & 0x03;
if(tid >= opt.r_npkts)
tid = opt.r_npkts;
for(i=0; i<=opt.r_npkts; i++)
{
if(i != tid)
{
// Set QoS priority
h80211[24] = i;
// Send frame
send_packet(h80211, caplen);
}
}
3.D Vulnerability Assessment Tool Command
Line Parameters
usage: tkipdos-ng <options> <replay interface>
Filter options:
-d dmac : MAC address, Destination
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-s smac : MAC address, Source
-t tods : frame control, To DS bit
-f fromds : frame control, From DS bit
-D : disable AP detection
Replay options:
-a bssid : set target AP MAC address
-e essid : set target AP SSID
-n npkts : number of replayed frames per frame captured [1-3]
-m natks : number of attacks (keep going forever if not set)
--help : Displays this usage screen
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Abstract
Mobile handhelds with wireless access are used in numerous safety critical
applications. The wireless network protocols in use are vulnerable to a wide
array of denial of service attacks. We propose a formal method for modeling
semantic denial of service attacks against wireless network protocols. We then
use our proposed model to find a new deadlock vulnerability in IEEE 802.11.
The history of published denial of service attacks against wireless protocols
indicates that formal methods can contribute to the construction of robust
protocols.
4.1 Introduction
The use of mobile handhelds in safety critical applications is increasing. Such devices
are used in life critical medical systems, intelligent transportation systems (ITS),
emergency communications and alarm systems. Furthermore, the current trend
is to use standard commercial off the shelf (COTS) equipment and protocols in
safety critical applications. Such safety critical applications require that the wireless
networks used for communication by the mobile handhelds are available when needed.
The availability of a wireless network can be disrupted by denial of service (DoS)
attacks. An adversary mounting a DoS attack on a wireless network used in safety
critical applications could cause injury or death, as well as significant material
damage.
We divide wireless network DoS attacks into four categories: Jamming attacks,
flooding attacks, semantic attacks and implementation specific attacks. Jamming
attacks are mounted by transmitting noise in the radio frequencies used by the
wireless network. Flooding attacks exhaust resources by sending a large amount of
messages to a protocol participant. Semantic attacks exploit protocol weaknesses by
transmitting valid protocol messages with forged message fields. One example of
a semantic attack is the deauthentication attack against IEEE 802.11 networks [5].
Finally, implementation specific attacks target implementation vulnerabilities in
specific hardware or software. This category of attacks includes transmitting invalid
protocol messages, since a correct implementation should discard all invalid messages.
Implementation specific attacks are not related to the protocol design and will not
be considered further in this paper.
The link layer protocols used in current wireless networks are vulnerable to
semantic DoS attacks. Vulnerable protocols are used in 802.11 wireless local area net-
works (WLANs) [5,19,20,40], 802.16 broadband networks [49], and GSM and UMTS
mobile networks [50]. Due to functionality, performance or cost requirements, certain
signaling messages used by these protocols are not integrity protected. One obvious
solution to this problem is to integrity protect every message. However, a wireless
network needs to exchange signaling messages, e.g. signal strength measurements,
before it starts the authentication and key agreement (AKA) procedure. These
initial signaling messages cannot be protected using the keys derived from the AKA
procedure. Furthermore, small battery powered devices might not have the resources
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to verify the integrity of every message. The integrity protection of time critical
signaling messages in wireless networks might limit the usable bandwidth. The
functionality of the wireless network might even depend on the use of unprotected
messages, e.g. a network that has to provide service to clients that do not support
any security mechanisms. As a consequence, these link layer protocols only protect a
subset of all protocol messages. Any unprotected message could potentially be used
by an adversary to disrupt the wireless network. Even the security mechanisms in
the long term evolution (LTE) fourth generation (4G) mobile networks only protect
a subset of the protocol messages [51].
A significant research effort has been invested in making network protocols more
robust against jamming and flooding attacks. The research results are formal
methods, models, tools and design principles to aid protocol designers [4, 10–13,
15, 16]. The research effort on semantic DoS attack detection and prevention has
been of a more informal nature. A multitude of semantic DoS attacks have been
discovered in existing wireless protocols, practical attacks have been demonstrated,
and ad hoc countermeasures have been proposed [5, 19, 20,40]. The fact that new
semantic vulnerabilities are routinely being discovered in proposed and operative
protocols indicates that it is difficult to avoid protocol vulnerabilities. To improve
the robustness of wireless networks used in safety critical applications, we need to
verify that an adversary cannot exploit unprotected protocol messages to disrupt
the service provided by the protocol.
Narayana et al. proposed a formal model for evaluating semantic DoS attacks
in 2006 [17]. To the best of our knowledge, this is the only proposed model of
semantic DoS attacks in the literature prior to our work. Narayana et al. use the
temporal logic of actions (TLA+) to model the protocol and adversary, and to
specify the model properties. They then apply the TLA+ model checker (TLC)
to find DoS vulnerabilities. They define a DoS attack as a situation where the
protocol participants cannot reach their final state. Our proposed model has three
major contributions compared to their model. First, we propose a cost model.
The cost model provides an objective quantification of the severity of the protocol
vulnerabilities. Second, our model is able to detect scenarios where participants
reach their final state, and are then desynchronized by a new attack. This kind of
attack will not be detected in the model proposed by Narayana et. al., since the
participants in this case are able to reach their final state. Third, we demonstrate
the usefulness of our model through the detection and experimental validation of a
previously unknown deadlock vulnerability in the 802.11 standard.
In this paper we propose a formal method and model for evaluating wireless
network protocol vulnerabilities to semantic DoS attacks. We analyze the adversary
goals to find an appropriate quantification of the adversary cost. We then quantify
the protocol participant cost, and propose an attack efficiency definition. Finally, we
use our model to discover a new deadlock vulnerability in the IEEE 802.11 family of
standards. The proposed formal method is not protocol specific, it can be used to
analyze any wireless protocol.
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Initiator Adversary Responder
Figure 4.1: Protocol model with initiator and responder. The adversary is modeled
as the network. The adversary can read, replay or forge every unprotected protocol
message. The adversary cannot delete or intercept (i.e. read and delete) protocol
messages.
Our work complements the research efforts to make wireless networks more
robust against jamming and flooding attacks. A network must be robust against
all categories of DoS attacks. If one category of attacks is not addressed, then an
adversary may still be able to disrupt the network.
The rest of this paper is structured as follows: Section 4.2 presents the formal
protocol model and adversary model. Section 4.3 presents the cost model. Section
4.4 presents our model of IEEE 802.11 and Section 4.5 presents the experimental
results. Finally, Section 4.6 gives the conclusions.
4.2 Protocol and Adversary Model
We model a two party protocol P as illustrated in Figure 4.1. The protocol partici-
pants are the initiator I and responder R.
Each participant has a set of local protocol states. We model I and R as
deterministic finite state transducers defined by the 7-tuples
I = (Σ, SI , sI0 , δI , ωI , γP ,FI)
R = (Σ, SR, sR0 , δR, ωR, γR,FR)
where:
•  is the empty string
• Σ = {σ|σ is a protocol message} ∪ {}
• SI = {sI |sI is a protocol initiator state}
• SR = {sR|sR is a protocol responder state}
• sI0 ∈ SI is the protocol initiator initial state
• sR0 ∈ SR is the protocol responder initial state
• δI : SI × Σ→ SI is the initiator state transition function
• δR : SR × Σ→ SR is the responder state transition function
• ωI : SI × Σ→ Σ is the initiator output function
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• ωR : SR × Σ→ Σ is the responder output function
• γI : SI × Σ→ R+is the initiator cost function
• γR : SR × Σ→ R+is the responder cost function
• FI ⊆ SI = {sI |sI ∈ SI andP provides service}
• FR ⊆ SR = {sR|sR ∈ SR andP provides service}
The service provided by a protocol depends on the protocol’s purpose. One common
service is the transport of higher layer user data. The protocol P is in a state (sI , sR)
where it provides service when (sI , sR) ∈ (FI × FR).
We model an adversaryA who can read, replay or forge every unprotected pro-
tocol message σA ∈ ΣA. The adversary cannot delete or intercept (i.e. read and
delete) messages. These capabilities correspond to a real world adversary who
utilizes commercial off the shelf hardware and software. An example of such an
adversary is someone with an 802.11 network interface card with driver support
for monitor mode and frame injection. When not attacking, the adversary sim-
ply forwards all messages between I and R. We model the attack behavior of
the adversary as a nondeterministic finite state transducer defined by the 7-tuple
A = (ΣA, SA, sA0 , δA, ωA, γA,FA)
where:
• ΣA ⊆ Σ = {σA|σA ∈ Σ andA can forge σA} ∪ {}
• SA = {sA|sA is an adversary state}
• sA0 ∈ SA is the adversary initial state
• δA : SA → P(SA) is the adversary state transition function
• ωA : SA → ΣA × ΣA is the adversary output function
• γA : SA → R+is the adversary cost function
• FA ⊆ SA = {sA|sA ∈ SA andA has finished attack}
The function ωA outputs a pair of messages. The first message is transmitted to I, and
the second message to R. If the output is (, ), then no messages are transmitted.
The adversary mounts an attack by transmitting one or more messages σA. A
successful attack triggers a transition from a protocol state (sI , sR) ∈ (FI × FR) to
a protocol state (sI , sR) /∈ (FI × FR). We limit the number of messages that the
adversary can transmit. Once this limit is reached, the adversary transitions to a
state sA ∈ FA .
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4.3 Cost Model
The model presented in Section 4.2 can be used without a cost model to find deadlock
vulnerabilities in a protocol. However, we have to define a cost model to find other
semantic DoS vulnerabilities that do not cause a deadlock, since a protocol might
be vulnerable to highly efficient attacks that cause temporary disruption. First,
we define four additional functions. The function τm : Σ→ R+, with τm() = 0,
represents the transmission time of a protocol message σ. The function τo : Σ→ R+,
with τo() = 0, represents the protocol overhead time of a message σ, e.g. waiting
for a time slot before message transmission. Finally, we define the functions:
τ(σ) = τm(σ) + τo(σ)
τmsum(σ1, σ2) = τm(σ1) + τm(σ2)
We assume that the adversary seeks to maximize network disruption and minimize
the probability of being located. The adversary has to be in physical proximity of a
wireless network in order to mount an attack. Location determination methods such
as triangulation or trilateration can be used by the network operator to determine
the physical location of the adversary. If an adversary is located, then an ongoing
attack can be stopped and the adversary can be apprehended. The precision of
location determination depends on the number of measurements. The longer an
adversary transmits a wireless signal, the higher the probability of being located.
An adversary would thus limit his transmission time to a minimum to avoid being
located.
The time spent transmitting a signal is also strongly correlated with energy
consumption. If an adversary can mount an attack by very infrequent transmissions,
then he could use a battery powered device to cause long term disruption of the
network. Such long lived, low power devices are referred to as “cyber mines” [16].
The ability to use “cyber mines” reduces the risk to the adversary, since he no longer
has to be physically present when the attack is mounted.
The adversary constraints are thus location determination time and energy usage.
We propose that the transmission time of the messages used for the attack, measured
in seconds, is the most appropriate quantification of the adversary cost ΓA. Formally,
we first define γA as follows:
γA(sA) =τmsum(ωA(sA))
We define the adversary cost ΓA as the cumulative output of γA, with ΓA = 0
in the initial state sA0 . A more sophisticated adversary model could include the
computational cost of constructing a message or breaking certain cryptographic
primitives as part of the cost function γA. We do not include these costs in our
model, since we model an adversary that only transmits unprotected messages. The
energy costs of computation are thus insignificant compared to the energy costs of
transmission.
A wireless network provides one or more services. A DoS attack causes a time
period where service is not provided. In our model, this is represented by the time
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spent in protocol states (sI , sR) /∈ (FI × FR). We propose to use this time period,
measured in seconds, to quantify the protocol cost ΓP . Formally, we first define γI
and γR as follows:
γI(sI , σ) =

0 if sI ∈ FI and
δ(sI , σ) ∈ FI
τ(ω(sI , σ)) if sI /∈ FI
τ(ω(sI , σ)) if sI ∈ FI and
δ(sI , σ) /∈ FI
γR(sR, σ) =

0 if sR ∈ FR and
δ(sR, σ) ∈ FR
τ(ω(sR, σ)) if sR /∈ FR
τ(ω(sR, σ)) if sR ∈ FR and
δ(sR, σ) /∈ FR
We then define ΓI as the cumulative output of γI , with ΓI = 0 in the initial state
sI0 . Next, we define ΓR as the cumulative output of γR, with ΓR = 0 in the initial
state sR0 . Finally, we define ΓP = ΓI + ΓR.
We compare the cumulative cost functions ΓA and ΓP to a physical layer jamming
attack as an illustration. In a constant jamming attack, the adversary transmits
noise in the radio frequencies used by the wireless network. As long as the adversary
is transmitting, the protocol does not provide service. Once the adversary stops
transmitting, the protocol immediately provides service again. In our model, ΓA
represents the time spent transmitting by the adversary and ΓP represents the time
period where the protocol does not provide service. Thus, an equivalent semantic
attack would have ΓA = ΓP .
To achieve his goals, an adversary would try to find attacks where ΓP  ΓA.
Such attacks could be considered as an amplifier for the adversary. An attack
where ΓP = 2ΓA is twice as efficient as a constant jamming attack, i.e. it has an
amplification of 2. We define this amplification as the attack efficiency E:
E =
ΓP
ΓA
The adversary’s goal is thus to find an attack with the highest possible attack
efficiency E. A semantic attack with E > 1 could be considered a protocol weakness.
However, it is up to the protocol designer to decide the acceptable attack efficiency
threshold.
Note that the cost model can be replaced by modifying the cost functions of the
protocol and adversary models. Our proposed cost model is simple, which makes it
easy to implement and model check. A more sophisticated cost model might give
more realistic results. The tradeoff between realism and practicality in the cost
model is one possible avenue of future work.
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4.4 Modeling IEEE 802.11
We validate the usefulness of our proposed model by model checking IEEE 802.11 [28].
IEEE 802.11 is a family of standards for wireless local area networks (WLANs). The
standard specifies the WLAN medium access control (MAC) and physical (PHY)
layers. The 802.11 specification is unclear on several points, which require interpreta-
tion. We use the open source hostapd [44] and wpa supplicant [52] implementations
of 802.11 as a guideline for how to interpret ambiguities. We model a subset of the
IEEE 802.11 MAC layer with the 802.11i [29] and 802.11h [41] amendments. The cost
parameters are based on the 802.11g [53] PHY layer with a 54 Mbit/s transfer speed.
We use the Promela language to implement the model and the SPIN model checker
to find protocol vulnerabilities [54]. Our model consists of three entities: An access
point (AP), a station (STA) and an adversary. The AP acts as the responder R
and the STA acts as the initiator I. The entities are modeled as Promela processes.
The cumulative cost functions ΓA and ΓP are global variables that are incremented
during state transitions. The network is modeled as two asynchronous message
channels in Promela, one in each direction. The STA initiates a connection setup
whenever it is in state sI0 .
Once the AP and STA have performed the 802.11 authentication, association and
key agreement procedures, they alternately send and receive data frames. We model
(sI , sR) ∈ (FI × FR) as the state where the STA receives a valid data frame from
the AP and then transmits a data frame to the AP. One major challenge of using
the proposed cost based model is how to avoid an infinite state space. If the protocol
participants enter an infinite loop through protocol states (sI , sR) /∈ (FI × FR),
then ΓP , and thus the state space, will keep increasing. We solve this by letting
only one of the participants initiate the transfer of data frames once the protocol
transitions from a state (sI , sR) /∈ (FI × FR) to a state (sI , sR) ∈ (FI × FR). While
in (sI , sR) ∈ (FI × FR) the participants only transmit a data frame once they receive
a data frame. If an attack causes a desynchronization of the participants, then
the 802.11 resynchronization mechanisms will enable the AP and STA to resume
communication. If, however, the resynchronization mechanisms fail, then the model
will deadlock. This property makes checking for protocol deadlock vulnerabilities
simple, since SPIN has a built-in test for deadlocks.
Having implemented the model in Promela, we then need to specify the properties
to be checked. We use linear temporal logic (LTL) for this purpose. The LTL formula
used for checking the cost based model is:
((ΓA = 0) ∨ (ΓP
ΓA
< T ))
The parameter T specifies the attack efficiency threshold. The most efficient
published DoS attack against 802.11 is the quiet attack from [40].
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4.5 Experimental Results
We first set the threshold to the efficiency of the quiet attack to verify that the
attack is found by the model checker. The result is that SPIN finds the quiet attack.
We then proceed to set the threshold to slightly more than the efficiency of the quiet
attack to see if a more efficient attack exists. The result is negative, the quiet attack
is the most efficient attack against 802.11 in our model. We then gradually lower
the threshold in order to find other less efficient attacks. The results are that the
model checker is able to find the previously known semantic DoS attacks against
802.11, but we do not find any new attacks.
We then proceed to check for deadlocks. The result is that SPIN finds a new
deadlock vulnerability in 802.11i. The adversary transmits a valid 802.11 Open
System authentication request from the STA to the AP while the protocol participants
are in a state (sI , sR) ∈ (FI × FR). The AP deletes its 802.11i security association
with the STA, but stays in 802.11 State 3. All data frames from the STA to the
AP are dropped, since they are encrypted and integrity protected with a key that
the AP no longer has access to. The AP cannot transmit any data frames to the
STA, since it is unable to sign and encrypt them. The 802.11 resynchronization
mechanisms are not triggered since both the AP and the STA are in 802.11 State 3.
We proceed to experimentally validate the vulnerability. We set up an 802.11
network using a wireless router with the hostapd software as the AP and a laptop
computer with the wpa supplicant software as the STA. The adversary causes a
protocol deadlock by transmitting a single authentication request frame. In practice,
the STA is able to recover after approximately 7 minutes due to an internal timeout.
This timeout is not specified in the 802.11 standard, however, so there is no guarantee
that other implementations would be able to recover. Even with this ability to recover,
the attack is far more efficient than any published DoS attacks against 802.11. The
author of hostapd and wpa supplicant has been notified about the vulnerability.
4.6 Conclusions
The history of published attacks against existing wireless protocols shows that the
design of robust protocols could greatly benefit from formal analysis tools. We
have proposed a formal method for modeling semantic DoS attacks against wireless
networks and shown how the model can be used to discover protocol vulnerabilities.
By this, we have found a new deadlock vulnerability in 802.11 and experimentally
validated it. Our proposed model can facilitate the design of robust protocols by
discovering vulnerabilities during the design process.
4.A 802.11 Background and Assumptions
IEEE 802.11 is a standard for wireless local area networks (WLANs). The standard
specifies the WLAN medium access control (MAC) and physical (PHY) layers. The
original 802.11 standard was published in 1997, and has since been updated numerous
times by amendments. The amendments are denoted by letters, e.g. 802.11i specifies
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security enhancements to the 802.11 standard. A new version of the 802.11 standard
was published in 2007 [28]. 802.11-2007 includes all amendments published prior
to 2007. Only a small subset of the relevant background material from the 802.11
standard can be included here due to space constraints. The reader is referred to
802.11-2007 [28] and 802.11w-2009 [30] for more details.
We use an infrastructure 802.11 WLAN as an example to illustrate the application
of the cost and efficiency definitions in [21]. One or more stations (STAs) connect
to an access point (AP). The AP forwards traffic between the STAs, as well as to
and from an external network. We assume that the network is configured to use
the extended rate physical layer with orthogonal frequency division multiplexing
(ERP-OFDM) specified in 802.11g [53]. The physical layer transfer speed of the
network is 54 Mbit/s. We analyze three different security configurations: Plain 802.11
without any security mechanisms, 802.11 with the robust security network (RSN)
specified in the 802.11i [29] amendment, and 802.11 with protected management
frames specified in the 802.11w [30] amendment. The use of 802.11w implies the use
of 802.11i RSN. For the RSN configuration, we assume that the network supports
both the transitional key integrity protocol (TKIP) and the counter mode with
cipher block chaining message authentication code protocol (CCMP).
An 802.11 network supports three different frame types: Data frames, manage-
ment frames and control frames. Data frames transport user data, management
frames are used for signaling, and control frames are used for time critical signaling
such as acknowledgments (ACKs). 802.11 supports reliable delivery of unicast data
and management frames using ACKs. Broadcast and multicast frames are not
acknowledged.
A STA has to perform the 802.11 authentication and association procedure
illustrated in Figure 4.2 before sending and receiving user data. The Open System
Authentication is a null authentication which is present due to historical reasons. It
does not actually provide any authentication. When the 802.11i RSN is used, the
STA and AP also have to perform an extensible authentication protocol over local
area networks (EAPOL) 4-way handshake to mutually authenticate and derive a
shared security association and session key. The session key is called the pairwise
transient key (PTK).
We assume an ideal radio frequency (RF) medium where no collisions or backoff
occur. Collisions and backoff would affect both the adversary and the legitimate
protocol participants, and would thus add random noise to the quantification of
the attack efficiency. The idealized RF medium assumption gives us an exact
quantification of the semantic protocol vulnerability, rather than one polluted by
random noise. We further assume that STAs always have data to send, and that all
data frames transmitted by STAs have a payload length of 1500 bytes. Whenever
the length of a certain management or control frame type is variable, we assume
that all necessary fields for the network configuration are included, but that all fields
are of the minimum length allowed. As an example, the service set identifier (SSID)
field can be from 2-34 bytes long. We assume that this field is always present in
relevant frames, and that it has a length of 2 bytes. Finally, we assume that the
802.11 distributed coordination function (DCF) is used.
We have to compute the transmission time of individual 802.11 frames before we
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Figure 4.2: 802.11 authentication and association. If 802.11i RSN is used, the STA
and AP have to perform an EAPOL 4-way handshake before the transport of user
data is enabled.
can compute ΓA, ΓP and E. Section 19.8.3.1 of 802.11-2007 [28] defines the total
transmission time T of an 802.11g frame as:
T = TPREAMBLE + TSIGNAL+
TSYM ∗ Ceiling(16 + 8 ∗ L + 6
NDBPS
)+
Signal Extension
Table 4.1 shows the timing parameters used in an 802.11g ERP-OFDM network
with a transmission speed of 54 Mbit/s. After a frame has been transmitted, all
stations wait for a time period defined as the inter-frame space (IFS) before they
try to transmit a new frame2. If the new frame is an ACK frame, a clear to send
(CTS) frame or the second or subsequent fragment of a fragment burst, then the
transmitting station waits for a short IFS (SIFS) before trying to transmit. Otherwise,
it waits for a DCF IFS (DIFS).
2The STAs will also wait for one or more time slots after the IFS due to the collision avoidance
mechanism in 802.11, but as mentioned previously, we assume that no backoff occurs.
62
Chapter 4. Paper C
TPREAMBLE TSIGNAL TSYM NDBPS Signal Extension SIFS DIFS
16µs 4µs 4µs 216 6µs 10µs 28µs
Table 4.1: Timing parameters for 802.11g networks (54 Mbit/s)
Finally, we have to determine the frame length L and compute τm and τo for the
frames used in the analysis in Section 4.B. Table 4.2 shows the results. For a detailed
description of the 802.11 frame fields and lengths, see Section 7 of 802.11-2007 [28],
802.11r-2008 [55] and 802.11w-2009 [30].
4.B Analysis of Semantic DoS Attacks Against
802.11
We use the definitions introduced in [21] to assess the efficiency of several published
DoS attacks against 802.11. The attacks being assessed are the deauthentication
attack [5], the disassociation attack [5], the virtual carrier sense (CS) attack [5],
the authentication request attack [19], the association request attack [19], the quiet
attack [40] and the TKIP Countermeasures attack [20]. We give a detailed analysis
of the deauthentication attack to illustrate the method of analysis. The analysis of
the other attacks is presented as a summary.
The deauthentication attack described in [5] is mounted by sending a management
frame of subtype deauthentication to the STA or AP. Figure 4.3 illustrates the attack
against a STA, and Figure 4.4 illustrates the attack against an AP. The 802.11
authentication and association procedure must be performed to recover from the
attack. If 802.11i is used, an EAPOL 4-way handshake also has to be performed.
802.11w prevents the deauthentication attack, since the deauthentication frames are
integrity protected.
Table 4.2 shows that the transmission time of a deauthentication frame is 34µs
in all three scenarios. The adversary cost ΓAdeauth is thus:
ΓAdeauth = τm(deauth) = 34µs
The deauthentication attack can be directed against either the STA or the AP.
We consider the attack against a plain 802.11 network, a network with 802.11i
RSN and a network with 802.11w protected management frames, for a total of six
combinations. Note that 802.11 uses a shared broadcast medium that can only
be accessed by one participant at any given time. Thus, we add τ(σA) to ΓP for
every message σA transmitted by the adversary. The rationale for this adjustment is
that the adversary denies service to the protocol participants while transmitting a
message. We calculate ΓP as follows:
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Frame Type (σ) L802.11 L802.11i L802.11w τm(σ)802.11
ACK 14 14 14 30µs
Action (SA Query) N/A N/A 48 N/A
ARP Request (TKIP) 64 84 84 38µs
Authentication 34 34 34 34µs
Association Request 46 74 74 34µs
Association Response 57 57 57 38µs
Beacon 98 126 126 42µs
CTS 14 14 14 30µs
Data (CCMP) 1528 1544 1544 254µs
Deauthentication 30 30 46 34µs
Disassociation 30 30 46 34µs
EAPOL Msg 1 N/A 157 157 N/A
EAPOL Msg 2 N/A 153 153 N/A
EAPOL Msg 3 N/A 191 215 N/A
EAPOL Msg 4 N/A 125 125 N/A
Frame Type (σ) τm(σ)802.11i τm(σ)802.11w τo(σ)
ACK 30µs 30µs 10µs
Action (SA Query) N/A 34µs 28µs
ARP Request (TKIP) 42µs 42µs 28µs
Authentication 34µs 34µs 28µs
Association Request 38µs 38µs 28µs
Association Response 38µs 38µs 28µs
Beacon 46µs 46µs 28µs
CTS 30µs 30µs 10µs
Data (CCMP) 258µs 258µs 28µs
Deauthentication 34µs 34µs 28µs
Disassociation 34µs 34µs 28µs
EAPOL Msg 1 50µs 50µs 28µs
EAPOL Msg 2 50µs 50µs 28µs
EAPOL Msg 3 58µs 62µs 28µs
EAPOL Msg 4 46µs 46µs 28µs
Table 4.2: L, τm and τo for relevant frame types. τo equals SIFS for ACK and
CTS frames, and DIFS for all other frames. The broadcast ARP Request frame
is protected using TKIP and the unicast data frame is protected using CCMP
when the 802.11i RSN is enabled. Some management frame types contain additional
information elements when the RSN is enabled, which can be observed as an increased
L parameter.
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Figure 4.3: The deauthentication attack against a STA.
Figure 4.4: The deauthentication attack against an AP.
ΓP deauthSTA(802.11) = τ(deauth) + τ(ACK)+
τ(auth) + τ(ACK)+
τ(auth) + τ(ACK)+
τ(assocreq) + τ(ACK)+
τ(assocresp) + τ(ACK)
= 514µs
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ΓP deauthAP(802.11) = τ(deauth) + τ(ACK)+
τ(data) + τ(ACK)+
τ(deauth) + τ(ACK)+
τ(auth) + τ(ACK)+
τ(auth) + τ(ACK)+
τ(assocreq) + τ(ACK)+
τ(assocresp) + τ(ACK)
= 938µs
ΓP deauthSTA(802.11i) = τ(deauth) + τ(ACK)+
τ(auth) + τ(ACK)+
τ(auth) + τ(ACK)+
τ(assocreq) + τ(ACK)+
τ(assocresp) + τ(ACK)+
τ(EAPOL1) + τ(ACK)+
τ(EAPOL2) + τ(ACK)+
τ(EAPOL3) + τ(ACK)+
τ(EAPOL4) + τ(ACK)
= 994µs
ΓP deauthAP(802.11i) = τ(deauth) + τ(ACK)+
τ(data) + τ(ACK)+
τ(deauth) + τ(ACK)+
τ(auth) + τ(ACK)+
τ(auth) + τ(ACK)+
τ(assocreq) + τ(ACK)+
τ(assocresp) + τ(ACK)+
τ(EAPOL1) + τ(ACK)+
τ(EAPOL2) + τ(ACK)+
τ(EAPOL3) + τ(ACK)+
τ(EAPOL4) + τ(ACK)
= 1422µs
ΓP deauthSTA(802.11w) = τ(deauth) + τ(ACK)
= 102µs
ΓP deauthAP(802.11w) = τ(deauth) + τ(ACK)
= 102µs
802.11w provides integrity protection for deauthentication frames. We assume
that the adversary is not able to send a valid integrity protected frame. Thus, once
the recipient has acknowledged reception of the frame it will be silently discarded
due to a failed integrity check.
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Attack (σA) ΓA802.11 ΓA802.11i ΓA802.11w
Deauth(STA) 34µs 34µs 34µs
Deauth(AP) 34µs 34µs 34µs
Disassoc(STA) 34µs 34µs 34µs
Disassoc(AP) 34µs 34µs 34µs
Virtual CS 30µs 30µs 30µs
Authentication 34µs 34µs 34µs
Association 34µs 38µs 38µs
Quiet 42µs 46µs 46µs
TKIP 76µs 84µs 84µs
Attack (σA) ΓP 802.11 ΓP 802.11i ΓP 802.11w
Deauth(STA) 514µs 994µs 102µs
Deauth(AP) 938µs 1422µs 102µs
Disassoc(STA) 310µs 790µs 102µs
Disassoc(AP) 734µs 1218µs 102µs
Virtual CS 32797µs 32797µs 32797µs
Authentication 734µs 1218µs 1222µs
Association 208µs 3001560µs 416µs
Quiet 67108864µs 67108864µs 67108864µs
TKIP 212µs 60001316µs 60001320µs
Table 4.3: The adversary cost ΓA and protocol cost ΓP for the assessed DoS
attacks. The high protocol cost of the association attack against 802.11i is due to
the AP initiating the EAPOL 4-way handshake and waiting for an answer to the
first EAPOL message. After trying to send EAPOL message 1 three times, and
waiting for 1 second after each transmitted message, the AP gives up and sends a
deauthentication frame to the STA. The association attack against 802.11w causes
the AP to initiate a security association (SA) Query procedure with the STA to
verify the liveness of its SA.
We compute ΓA and ΓP for the other attacks using the same procedure as for
the deauthentication attack. The results are presented in Table 4.3.
We can now compute the efficiency E of the DoS attacks. Figure 4.5 illustrates
the results.
4.C Discussion
The cost functions and attack efficiency definition proposed in [21] can be used
to quantitatively compare known DoS attacks, as illustrated in Section 4.B. The
analysis shows that the quiet attack [40] is the most efficient published DoS attack
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Figure 4.5: The efficiency E of the assessed DoS attacks. We use a logarithmic
scale to illustrate the large differences in efficiency. The most efficient attacks are
several orders of magnitude more efficient than any of the other attacks. Note that
E = 3 for the DoS attacks that are prevented by the security mechanisms. This
is due to the time slots and acknowledgment mechanisms in 802.11. The frame
transmitted by the adversary will be acknowledged by the recipient, and during this
time period the network will not provide service to the legitimate participants. It is
thus impossible to prevent attacks with E 5 3 against 802.11 without significant
changes to the standard.
against 802.11, closely followed by the TKIP Countermeasures attack [20]. The
802.11w amendment prevents the deauthentication, disassociation and association
attacks, but provides no protection against the most efficient DoS attacks.
However, the main motivation of our work is to facilitate formal modeling of
semantic protocol vulnerabilities. All of the analysis in this Appendix is purely
theoretical, based on the protocol description. The analysis could thus be carried
out at the design stage, before the protocol is implemented. Errors discovered at
an early stage can be amended much more cheaply than errors discovered after
implementation and deployment.
We are currently using Promela to implement a formal model of 802.11 that can
be used to identify other, unknown protocol vulnerabilities or to verify the absence
of semantic protocol vulnerabilities with the help of the SPIN model checker [56].
The finite state transducers are implemented as processes. The cumulative cost
functions ΓA and ΓP are implemented as global variables that are incremented by
the process cost functions γA, γI and γR. Message channels deliver the output
messages of one process as input messages to another process. E is used in a linear
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temporal logic (LTL) formula that specifies the acceptable attack efficiency threshold.
As an example, given the LTL formula ♦(E > 10), the SPIN model checker finds
all attacks with E > 10, or proves that no such attacks are possible against the
implemented protocol model. The model checker can also determine if an attack
can cause a protocol deadlock. Preliminary results indicate that we are able to
discover sophisticated multi-message attacks with high efficiency using our model.
Such attacks are difficult to discover by manual analysis, and their discovery confirms
the value of using a formal model.
Our proposed method could benefit from a more sophisticated adversary model.
Future work includes modeling an adversary who can delete and intercept messages,
break certain cryptographic primitives, and corrupt protocol participants. Modifying
the adversary can be done independently of the protocol model, since we use a
separate finite state transducer for the adversary.
The practical ΓP of DoS attacks might be higher than the theoretical ΓP presented
in Section 4.B. One reason for this is that authentication and key agreement such
as the EAPOL 4-way handshake include computationally expensive operations. To
make ΓP more realistic, one might include the computational cost (time) in addition
to the transmission cost (time) to recover from an attack. Another reason is that
higher layer protocols are involved. If the protocol initiator uses higher layer protocols
such as the Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol (DHCP) [47] and the Address
Resolution Protocol (ARP) [46], then adding the cost of these protocol messages to
ΓP would give a more realistic result.
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Abstract
Formal methods can be used to discover obscure denial of service (DoS)
vulnerabilities in wireless network protocols. The application of formal methods
to the analysis of DoS vulnerabilities in communication protocols is not a
mature research area. Although several formal models have been proposed, they
lack a clear and convincing demonstration of their usefulness and practicality.
This paper bridges the gap between theory and practice, and shows how a
simple protocol model can be used to discover protocol deadlock vulnerabilities.
A deadlock vulnerability is the most severe form of DoS vulnerabilities, thus
checking for deadlock vulnerabilities is an essential part of robust protocol
design. We demonstrate the usefulness of the proposed method through
the discovery and experimental validation of deadlock vulnerabilities in the
published IEEE 802.11w amendment to the 802.11 standard. We present the
complete procedure of our approach, from model construction to verification
and validation. An Appendix includes the complete model source code, which
facilitates the replication and extension of our results. The source code can
also be used as a template for modeling other protocols.
5.1 Introduction
Wireless network access protocols are used in numerous safety critical applications,
such as life critical medical devices, supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA)
systems, smart grid applications, intelligent transportation systems (ITS), emergency
communications and alarm systems. Network availability is important for safety
critical applications, since loss of availability can cause physical damage. An adversary
can disrupt the availability of a wireless network using denial of service (DoS) attacks.
The most widely deployed wireless protocols are vulnerable to DoS attacks.
Throughout the last decade researchers have published DoS attacks against IEEE
802.11 local area networks (LANs) [5, 19,20,40], IEEE 802.16 wide area networks
(WANs) [49] and GSM and UMTS mobile networks [50]. One of the most common
forms of wireless DoS attacks is semantic attacks, i.e. to send valid protocol messages
that cause one or more protocol participants to lose state synchronization. Semantic
attacks can be highly efficient, since the participants may have to spend a significant
amount of time to detect and correct the lost synchronization. The most severe
semantic DoS attacks can cause a protocol deadlock. A deadlock state is a global
state where the protocol participants are not able to recover to a functional state.
In this paper, we apply formal methods for the analysis of deadlock vulnerabilities
in the IEEE 802.11 medium access control (MAC) layer [28] with the 802.11i [29] and
802.11w [30] amendments. The motivation for using 802.11w as our target protocol is
that it has been subject to extensive manual analysis. The 802.11w designers found
a deadlock vulnerability in an early draft of 802.11w. The protocol specification
was modified because deadlock vulnerabilities were considered unacceptable. The
802.11w amendment has also been subject to manual analysis by independent
researchers [19, 57]. Thus, we consider 802.11w as an appropriate subject for our
investigation.
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The main contribution of our work is a demonstration of how formal methods can
be used to find deadlock vulnerabilities. In particular, we investigate how to automat-
ically discover vulnerabilities through the construction and verification of a formal
protocol model. Our work bridges the gap between theory and practice by giving a
detailed description of how to construct and verify a simple and useful protocol model,
including the complete model source code. The proposed approach to modeling and
verification could help protocol designers discover deadlock vulnerabilities at an early
stage of the design process.
Several formal models for the analysis of protocol DoS vulnerabilities have been
proposed [4, 17, 58]. To the best of our knowledge, none of the proposed models
have been demonstrated to be both easy to implement and able to discover deadlock
vulnerabilities in protocols.
The rest of this paper is structured as follows: Section 5.2 introduces relevant
parts of the 802.11 standard and related work. Section 5.3 constructs the model.
Section 5.4 presents the verification results from the model checker. Section 5.5 is an
experimental validation of the verification results. Section 5.6 discusses the results.
Section 5.7 concludes the paper. The Appendix includes the complete source code of
our model.
5.2 Background and Related Work
The IEEE 802.11 standard for wireless LANs (WLANs) was ratified in 1997 and
accepted as an ISO standard in 1999. The most recent version of the standard is
802.11-2007 [28], which includes the 802.11i-2004 amendment [29]. 802.11i-2004 spec-
ifies security enhancements for the 802.11 MAC layer. The 802.11w-2009 amendment
specifies protection of management frames of subtype Deauthentication, Disasso-
ciation and Action using the 802.11i security mechanisms [30]. Figure 5.1 shows
the connection establishment protocol in an 802.11 network with the 802.11i and
802.11w amendments.
The 802.11 standard specifies three protocol states for 802.11 authentication and
association. The 802.11 association is established prior to the security association
(SA). Figure 5.2 shows the 802.11 states and transitions. The access point (AP)
stores a separate state for every corresponding station (STA). Every STA stores a
state for the AP it communicates with. The state is represented by two Boolean
state variables, an authentication variable and an association variable. In State 1
both the variables are false. In State 2 the authentication variable is true and the
association variable is false. In State 3 both variables are true.
Every frame type is categorized as Class 1, 2 or 3. Data frames are Class 3
frames. If an AP or STA is in State 1 and receives a Class 2 or Class 3 frame, then
the recipient will discard the frame and respond with a Deauthentication notification
with Reason Code 6 or 7. If a Class 3 frame is received while in State 2, then the
recipient will discard the frame and respond with a Disassociation notification with
Reason Code 7. The purpose of these responses is to resynchronize the protocol
participants in the case of a state mismatch. The 802.11 standard does not clearly
specify how to handle the situation where the AP is in State 3 and then receives an
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Figure 5.1: 802.11 with 802.11i and 802.11w connection establishment. A station
(STA) connects to an access point (AP). The Open System Authentication exchange
is a null authentication, present due to legacy reasons. A successful 802.11 association
triggers an Extensible Authentication Protocol over local area networks (EAPOL)
4-way handshake that provides authenticated key agreement. The 4-way handshake
creates a shared pairwise transient key (PTK) which is used to protect unicast
traffic between the STA and AP. The group temporal key (GTK) and integrity GTK
(IGTK) are used to protect broadcast data frames and management frames from the
AP to the STA. A message integrity code (MIC) is used to protect EAPOL messages
2, 3 and 4. Message 1 is not protected.
Authentication Request. The textual description states that the AP should enter
State 2, while the state transition diagram does not allow such a transition. Some
implementations by Cisco follow the textual description and let the AP transition to
State 2 [19]. Conversely, the open source hostapd [44] implementation leaves the AP
in State 3. We model both of these behaviors since the 802.11 standard is open to
interpretation on this point.
The IEEE 802.11 Task Group w (TGw) started developing the 802.11w amend-
ment in 2005. In 2007, a TGw member discovered a deadlock vulnerability in the
802.11w draft [18]. Figure 5.3 illustrates an attack exploiting this vulnerability.
The presence of a deadlock vulnerability in 802.11w was considered unacceptable
by TGw. An SA Query procedure was thus added to the 802.11w draft as a
countermeasure. When an AP receives an Association Request from a STA, the AP
does not immediately accept the Association Request if the STA is associated to the
AP and there is a valid SA between them. The AP starts a timer and responds with
an Association Response. The Association Response informs the STA that it must
wait until the timer expires before it tries to associate again. The AP then sends
a protected SA Query Request to the STA. If a protected SA Query Response is
received, then the previous Association Request is ignored and the timer is canceled.
If no response is received before the timer expires, then the AP will accept the next
Association Request from that STA. The STA sends a new Association Request,
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Figure 5.2: The 802.11 states and transitions. Note that the Deauthentication and
Disassociation notifications are protected in 802.11w. If a recipient has an active
security association and receives an unprotected Deauthentication or Disassociation
frame, then it will silently discard that frame.
Figure 5.3: The 802.11w association attack discovered by TGw. The AP deletes its
security association after a successful 802.11 association. The AP starts the EAPOL
4-way handshake, but gets no response from the STA. After a timeout, the AP enters
State 1, where it discards all Class 2 and 3 frames. The AP has deleted its security
association and PTK, and is thus not able to send a protected Deauthentication
notification to the STA. Every unprotected Deauthentication notification from the
AP is discarded by the STA.
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and the AP sends an Association Response. Finally, the AP sends a protected
Disassociation notification to the STA before it deletes its SA and proceeds to the
EAPOL 4-way handshake.
In previous work, we described and analyzed this deadlock vulnerability and the
SA Query procedure [19]. Part of the conclusions in [19] is that if an adversary is
able to delete frames, then he can cause a deadlock even if the SA Query procedure
is used. Ahmad and Tadakamadla later improved the association attack [57]. They
proposed to use a virtual jamming attack [5] to prevent the STA from responding to
the SA Query Requests. They also provided experimental validation of their attack
using the hostapd software [44] as the AP and wpa supplicant [52] as the STA. One
issue with their analysis is that they ignored that the AP will send a protected
Disassociation notification before it deletes the SA, which is a mandatory requirement
in 802.11w [30, p. 74]. The STA will delete its SA and enter State 2 when it receives
the protected Disassociation notification, thus avoiding a deadlock. The reason why
their attack worked in practice is that this feature is not yet implemented in hostapd.
A comment in the hostapd source code states that the feature will be implemented.
Thus, the attack proposed by Ahmad and Tadakamadla will not cause a deadlock
against a standards compliant 802.11w implementation.
802.11w also specifies an optional deadlock recovery mechanism [30, p. 75]. If a
STA has a valid SA and receives an unprotected Deauthentication or Disassociation
frame with Reason Code 6 or 7 from the AP, then the STA may initiate an SA Query
procedure. If the SA Query procedure fails, then the STA may delete its SA and
enter State 1. We model 802.11w both with and without this mechanism, since it is
an optional part of the specification.
5.3 Model Construction
We construct a model of 802.11 with the 802.11i and 802.11w amendments using the
formal method proposed in [21]. Promela is used as the modeling language and the
Spin model checker is used to verify the model properties [56]. We use an iterative
method to develop our model. The method starts with a simple model, uses the
model checker to verify the model properties, and then refines the model. We use a
high level of abstraction in order to keep the model state space as small as possible.
As specified in [21], our model consists of three entities: the AP, the STA and
the adversary. Each entity is defined as a finite state transducer. We use the 802.11
frames as the transducer input and output messages. The AP and STA entities
are modeled according to the protocol specification. The AP and STA transduc-
ers are deterministic except for a few cases where protocol timeouts are modeled
nondeterministically. The adversary transducer is completely nondeterministic. It
selects a frame type randomly and transmits this frame to either the AP or STA.
The adversary may transmit its frames at any time during model execution. The
adversary is only allowed to transmit frames that are not protected by the security
mechanisms. The total number of frames it can transmit is limited by an upper
bound. Since a model checker enumerates every possible model state, it discovers
every possible attack from the adversary.
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We model the AP, STA and adversary entities as Promela proctype declarations.
We construct the model so that it stops execution if the protocol is in a state where
it is unable to recover. The model thus stops execution in the cases where the
actual protocol executes an infinite loop. Since we can use Spin to verify the safety
property “invalid endstates”, this construction facilitates the discovery of deadlock
vulnerabilities. By carefully balancing the transmission of Data frames, we achieve
the desired model property: that the model stops execution if the protocol is unable
to recover. The AP and STA do not transmit a Data frame unless they first receive
a valid Data frame. There are two exceptions to this rule. First, the AP sends a
Data frame once it receives a valid EAPOL message 4 at the end of the EAPOL
4-way handshake. Second, the STA sends a Data frame if it uses the wrong 802.11
channel and then receives a Beacon frame instructing it to switch back to the correct
channel.
The entity state machines for the AP and STA consist of the 802.11 State, the
802.11 channel, the SA state, the SA Query state, the last frame sent and the last
frame received. We use the last frame sent and the last frame received as part of the
entity states because the 802.11 standard does not specify state transitions for every
single frame. For example, consider the transition “Successful Authentication” in
Figure 5.2. This transition consists of two frames: an Authentication Request from
the STA to the AP, and an Authentication Response from the AP to the STA. If
the STA does not change its state after sending the Authentication Request, then it
immediately sends another Authentication Request. The AP and STA thus need to
store these frames in order to behave correctly. Conversely, the adversary state is
determined only by the number of frames that it has transmitted. The total number
of frames that the adversary can transmit is limited by a configurable upper bound.
The adversary process terminates once the upper bound is reached.
Our next challenge is to model protocol timeouts. If possible, we model protocol
timeouts using internal signaling messages. Consider the case that the AP sends
EAPOL message 1, but the STA does not expect this message. In our model, the
STA knows that the message will be discarded, thus it can send an internal signaling
message to the AP to trigger the AP timeout procedure. We use the same approach
to handle SA Query timeouts. However, we cannot use this approach when we
process frames that could have been sent by the adversary. We use the Promela
timeout statement to handle these cases. The Promela timeout statement is a global
Boolean variable that is true, i.e. executable, if and only if no other model statement
is executable. In other words, the execution of a timeout statement implies that
either a protocol deadlock or a protocol timeout has occurred. We place the timeout
statement inside the STA proctype declaration, since all of the AP timeouts are
handled using internal signaling messages. When the timeout statement is executed,
we check if the protocol is in a state where the STA would experience a protocol
timeout. If the STA experiences a protocol timeout, then it follows the timeout
procedure. Otherwise, the model execution is halted. Finally, we allow our adversary
to halt its execution at any time, and to resume execution once the timeout statement
is executed. The rationale for this construction is that the adversary process is
always executable until it terminates. If the adversary is not allowed to halt its
execution, then we would not be able to discover deadlock vulnerabilities where a
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protocol timeout occurs and the adversary then sends additional frames after the
timeout.
We include the complete model source code in the Appendix. The Promela code
in the Appendix can be used together with the model checker Spin to replicate our
results or to investigate the effects of protocol modifications.
5.4 Model Verification
We use Spin version 6.0.1 with the iSpin version 1.0.4 interface to verify our model
using the safety property “invalid endstates”. The model checker finds no deadlocks
when the optional deadlock recovery mechanism described in Section 5.2 is enabled.
We disable this mechanism and repeat the model verification. The model checker
then finds several attacks that cause a deadlock in 802.11w. We analyze the attacks
and discover three underlying protocol vulnerabilities.
The first vulnerability is that the AP can be disconnected after sending EAPOL
message 3. This results in a state where the STA has a valid SA and the AP does not
have a valid SA. Figure 5.4 illustrates an attack against this vulnerability. The attack
targets the EAPOL 4-way handshake used in the initial connection establishment.
The adversary has to send its Deauthentication notification1 before the STA sends
EAPOL message 4. Furthermore, the attack only works if the STA activates its
security association before it receives the Deauthentication notification from the AP.
The attack cannot be mounted against an established connection. However, if a
different attack is able to cause a state reset and a new connection establishment,
then a combination of attacks can cause a deadlock against an established connection.
The second vulnerability is that if the AP is in 802.11 State 2, then an SA Query
procedure will not be triggered when it receives an Association Request. The AP
transitions to State 2 after a successful 802.11 authentication if the implementation
follows the textual description in the 802.11 standard. Figure 5.5 illustrates an attack
against the second vulnerability. The attack can be mounted against an established
connection.
The third vulnerability is that frame deletion is possible through the use of Beacon
frames with the Channel Switch Announcement element specified in 802.11h [41].
This type of Beacon frame can make the STA switch to a different channel. The STA
does not receive any frames from the AP when it is on the wrong channel. Beacon
frames are not protected by 802.11w, thus they can be forged by the adversary.
Figure 5.6 illustrates an attack against this vulnerability. In theory, this attack only
works against a STA with 802.11h spectrum management support operating in the 5
GHz band. However, the results in [40] show that the attack may also work against
drivers that support 802.11h even when they operate in the 2.4 GHz band. The
attack can be mounted against an established connection.
1A Disassociation notification could also be used, the end result would be the same.
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Figure 5.4: The first deadlock vulnerability in 802.11w. The adversary listens
for an EAPOL 4-way handshake. Once the AP transmits EAPOL message 3, the
adversary sends an unprotected Deauthentication notification to the AP. The AP
thus deletes its derived PTK and transitions to State 1. The STA sends EAPOL
message 4 to the AP, and the STA then installs the PTK and enables the security
association. Since EAPOL message 4 is a Class 3 frame, the AP responds with an
unprotected Deauthentication notification. This frame is discarded by the STA.
Figure 5.5: The second deadlock vulnerability in 802.11w. The adversary sends an
Authentication Request to the AP, which transitions to State 2. The adversary then
sends an Association Request to the AP, which then deletes its SA and initiates an
EAPOL 4-way handshake. Once the 4-way handshake timeout occurs, the AP sends
an unprotected Deauthentication notification to the STA. This frame is discarded by
the STA.
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Figure 5.6: The third deadlock vulnerability in 802.11w. The AP, STA and
adversary are on 802.11 channel A. The adversary broadcasts a Beacon frame with a
Channel Switch Announcement element on channel A. The Beacon frame instructs
the STA to switch to channel B. The adversary then transmits an Association
Request to the AP, waits for the SA Query timeout, and then transmits another
Association Request to the AP. Finally, the adversary broadcasts a Beacon frame
with a Channel Switch Announcement element on channel B. The Beacon frame
instructs the STA to switch to channel A. The STA does not receive any of the
frames between the first and last Beacon frames, since it is on a different channel.
5.5 Experimental Validation
We implement the attacks described in Section 5.4. We then test the attacks against
an 802.11w implementation in order to validate the model verification results and to
determine if the attacks are practical.
We use the C programming language with the libraries from the aircrack-ng [27]
tool suite as our implementation framework. Linksys WRT160NL wireless routers are
used as the AP and STA, with the OpenWrt development version r27551 firmware [43].
Hostapd v0.8.x is installed on the AP and wpa supplicant v0.8.x is installed on the
STA. Both the AP and STA use the ath9k wireless driver in 802.11g mode (2.4
GHz band). The ath9k driver is currently the only driver that supports 802.11w
with hostapd and wpa supplicant. We use hostapd and wpa supplicant because they
provide an open source implementation of 802.11w. Therefore, we can modify their
behavior in order to test different configurations and interpretations of the standard.
We use a laptop with the Fedora Linux 14 operating system as the adversary. An
Asus WL-167g wireless network card is used with the rt73usb driver in monitor mode
to capture and inject 802.11 frames.
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The first attack works as expected. The adversary waits until it receives EAPOL
message 3, and then immediately transmits a Deauthentication frame to the AP. The
Deauthentication frame consistently arrives earlier than EAPOL message 4 from the
STA. Furthermore, the STA installs the PTK and activates the security association
before it processes the Deauthentication frame from the AP. However, wpa supplicant
does implement the optional deadlock recovery mechanism in 802.11w. The result of
the attack is that the STA initiates an SA Query procedure, reaches a timeout, and
then resets its state and reconnects. We disable the recovery mechanism and repeat
the experiment. The attack causes a protocol deadlock, which validates the formal
protocol analysis results. In the following experiments the recovery mechanism is
disabled.
The second attack should not work against hostapd, since its interpretation of the
802.11 standard is to leave the AP in State 3 after a successful authentication. We
modify hostapd so that it transitions to State 2 after a successful authentication and
mount our attack. The result is that the AP still performs the SA Query procedure,
so the attack does not work as expected. We examine the hostapd source code
and discover that the criteria for starting an SA Query procedure do not follow
the 802.11w specification. In particular, hostapd does not check that the STA is
associated before it starts the SA Query procedure. We modify hostapd to make it
conform to the 802.11w specification. With our modification, hostapd only starts an
SA Query procedure if the STA is already associated. We then repeat the experiment,
and the attack causes a protocol deadlock.
The third attack does not work as expected. The AP and STA are initially on
802.11 channel 11. The first Beacon frame from the adversary instructs the STA
to switch to channel 1. The STA performs the channel switch, but it resets and
reconnects after a short while. The cause of this behavior is that the STA does not
receive any Beacon frames on channel 1, thus it assumes that the connection is lost.
We modify our adversary to switch to channel 1 and send a Beacon frame every 100
ms while it waits for the SA Query timeout. We then repeat the experiment, and
the attack causes a protocol deadlock.
Finally, due to the fact that the STA resets and reconnects after a channel switch,
we investigate a combination of the first and third attacks. We use the Beacon frame
from the third attack to reset the STA state, and then mount the first attack against
the following connection establishment. The attack causes a protocol deadlock. The
use of a Beacon frame with the Channel Switch Announcement element enables the
first attack to work against an established connection.
We conclude that the deadlock attacks found during the formal protocol analysis
described in Section 5.4 are practical, and that the model verification results are
valid.
5.6 Discussion
802.11w is still vulnerable to deadlock attacks, even though the SA Query procedure is
designed to prevent such attacks. We are able to find three deadlock vulnerabilities in
802.11w using formal methods. We then find attacks that exploit these vulnerabilities
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and demonstrate that the attacks are practical. One consequence of our results is
that the optional deadlock recovery mechanism specified in 802.11w should be a
mandatory requirement. If the recovery mechanism is not implemented, then the
protocol implementation is vulnerable to deadlock attacks.
However, our main contribution is not the discovery of deadlock vulnerabilities in
802.11w. Our main contribution is a demonstration of how formal protocol analysis
can be used to find such vulnerabilities, and that a useful formal protocol model
can be constructed with a modest amount of resources. If the 802.11w amendment
had been formally analyzed during development, then the deadlock vulnerabilities
could have been detected and corrected before publication. Correcting protocol
vulnerabilities during the design stage requires far less time and resources than
correcting them after the standard has been approved and implemented. A common
objection to the use of formal methods is that it requires too much time and resources.
We give a counterexample to this objection by showing that a simple model can
provide useful and significant results.
Another advantage of constructing a formal protocol model during the design
process is that the model is an unambiguous and precise protocol specification. As
discussed in Section 5.2, the 802.11 standard is open to interpretation on several
points due to vagueness and ambiguities. This can cause interoperability problems
and vulnerabilities. Furthermore, our experience is that the construction of a formal
protocol model gives the protocol designers a better understanding of the protocol
details.
Our model is not complete, since it only covers a subset of all frame types defined
in the 802.11 standard. Thus, the model cannot be used to verify the absence of
deadlock vulnerabilities in its current form.
The model source code [59], included in the Appendix, can be used to replicate
and extend our results. It can also be used as the basis for a more comprehensive
model of 802.11w or as a template for the construction of other protocol models.
The protocol model can be extended with the cost model proposed in [21]. This
extension would enable the discovery of less severe semantic DoS attacks that do
not cause a protocol deadlock.
5.7 Conclusions
We have discovered and validated three new deadlock vulnerabilities in 802.11w
with the help of formal methods. The results show that a simple protocol model
can give useful and significant results, thus bridging the gap between theory and
design. We hope that this work can contribute to a more widespread use of formal
analysis during protocol design, and thus improve the robustness of wireless network
protocols.
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5.A Promela model of 802.11w
#d e f i n e cs 5
#d e f i n e a t t 4
/∗ cs = channel ( queue ) s i z e
∗ at t = Adversary upper bound ( number o f frames )
∗/
mtype = {authreq , authresp , assocreq , a s socre sp ,
deauth , d i s a s soc , data , eapol1 , eapol2 ,
eapol3 , eapol4 , eaptime , csw , saqreq ,
saqres , saqtime , DUMMY} ;
/∗ I s op t i ona l deadlock recovery enabled ? ∗/
bool recovery = f a l s e ;
/∗ I s 802 .11 h enabled ? ∗/
bool dot11h = true ;
/∗ Trans i s i on to State 2 a f t e r Authent icat ion ? ∗/
bool auths tate2 = f a l s e ;
/∗ Allow at tacks during connect ion es tab l i shment ∗/
bool setup = f a l s e ;
/∗ Set to t rue once connect ion i s e s t a b l i s h e d ∗/
bool e s t a b l i s h e d = f a l s e ;
bool t imeout f l ag = 0 ;
typede f Msg {
mtype type ;
shor t c l a s s ; /∗ 1 , 2 or 3 ∗/
bool mic ; /∗ True i f frame has v a l i d MIC ∗/
shor t ch ; /∗ 802 .11 channel ( f requency ) ∗/
} ;
typede f State80211 {
bool au ; /∗ 802 .11 au then t i c a t i on s t a t e ∗/
bool as ; /∗ 802 .11 a s s o c i a t i o n s t a t e ∗/
bool sa ; /∗ 802 .11 i RSN Secur i ty As soc i a t i on ∗/
shor t ch ; /∗ 802 .11 channel ( f requency ) ∗/
mtype lm ; /∗ Last message sent ∗/
mtype lmr ; /∗ Last message r e c e i v e d ∗/
} ;
/∗ Message channe l s ( queues ) ∗/
chan toAP = [ cs ] o f { Msg } ;
chan toSTA = [ cs ] o f { Msg } ;
proctype AP( ) {
/∗ SA Query s t a t e ∗/
bool saqt imeout = 0 ; bool s a q a c t i v e = 0 ;
Msg m; State80211 s ;
s . au = 0 ; s . as = 0 ; s . sa = 0 ; s . ch = 1 ;
s . lm = DUMMY; s . lmr = DUMMY;
do
/∗ Star t EAPOL 4−way handshake ∗/
: : atomic{
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( s . au && s . as && ! s . sa && s . lm == as so c r e sp ) −>
m. type = eapol1 ; m. c l a s s = 3 ; m. ch = s . ch ;
m. mic = 0 ; s . lm = m. type ; toSTA ! m;}
: : atomic{
nempty (toAP) −> toAP ? m; s . lmr = m. type ;}
i f
/∗ Class 2 or 3 frame r e c e i v e d in State 1 ∗/
: : atomic{
( ! s . au && ! s . as && m. c l a s s != 1 &&
m. ch == s . ch && m. type != saqreq ) −>
m. type = deauth ; m. c l a s s = 1 ;
m. ch = s . ch ; m. mic = s . sa ;
s . lm = m. type ; toSTA ! m; s . sa = 0 ;}
/∗ Class 3 frame r e c e i v e d in State 2 ∗/
: : atomic{
( s . au && ! s . as && m. c l a s s == 3 &&
m. ch == s . ch && m. type != saqreq ) −>
m. type = d i s a s s o c ; m. c l a s s = 2 ;
m. ch = s . ch ; m. mic = s . sa ;
s . lm = m. type ; toSTA ! m;
s . sa = 0 ;}
/∗ Authent icat ion Request ∗/
: : atomic{
(m. type == authreq && m. ch == s . ch ) −>
m. type = authresp ; m. c l a s s = 1 ;
m. ch = s . ch ; m. mic = 0 ;
s . lm = m. type ; toSTA ! m;
s . au = 1 ;
i f
/∗ Enter State 2 ∗/
: : ( auths tate2 ) −> s . as = 0 ;
/∗ Do not change a s s o c i a t i o n s t a t u s ∗/
: : ( ! authstate2 ) −> sk ip ;
f i }
/∗ Assoc i a t i on Request ∗/
: : atomic{
( s . au && m. type == as soc r eq &&
m. ch == s . ch ) −>
i f
: : ( ! s . sa | | ! s . as ) −>
m. type = as s o c r e sp ;
m. c l a s s = 2 ; m. ch = s . ch ;
m. mic = 0 ; s . lm = m. type ;
toSTA ! m; s . au = 1 ;
s . as = 1 ; s . sa = 0 ;
/∗ SA Query ∗/
: : ( s . as && s . sa && ! saqtimeout &&
! s a q a c t i v e ) −>
m. type = saqreq ; m. c l a s s = 3 ;
m. ch = s . ch ; m. mic = 1 ;
s . lm = m. type ; toSTA ! m;
s a q a c t i v e = 1 ;
: : s a q a c t i v e −> sk ip ;
: : ( s . as && s . sa && saqtimeout ) −>
m. type = d i s a s s o c ; m. c l a s s = 2 ;
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m. mic = 1 ; s . lm = m. type ;
toSTA ! m; s . sa = 0 ;
m. type = as s o c r e sp ;
m. c l a s s = 2 ; m. ch = s . ch ;
m. mic = 0 ; s . lm = m. type ;
toSTA ! m; saqtimeout = 0 ;
f i
}
/∗ EAPOL message 2 ∗/
: : atomic{
( s . au && s . as && ! s . sa &&
m. type == eapol2 &&
m. ch == s . ch && m. mic ) −>
m. type = eapol3 ; m. c l a s s = 3 ;
m. ch = s . ch ; m. mic = 1 ;
s . lm = m. type ; toSTA ! m;}
/∗ EAPOL message 4 ∗/
: : atomic{
( s . au && s . as && ! s . sa &&
m. type == eapol4 &&
m. ch == s . ch && m. mic ) −>
s . sa = 1 ; m. type = data ;
m. c l a s s = 3 ; m. ch = s . ch ;
m. mic = 1 ; s . lm = m. type ;
e s t a b l i s h e d = 1 ; toSTA ! m;}
/∗ EAPOL 4−way handshake timeout ∗/
: : atomic{
(m. type == eaptime ) −>
m. type = deauth ; m. c l a s s = 1 ;
m. mic = s . sa ; s . lm = m. type ;
toSTA ! m; s . au = 0 ; s . as = 0 ;
s . sa = 0 ;}
/∗ Deauthent icat ion p r o c e s s i n g ∗/
: : atomic{
(m. type == deauth && m. ch == s . ch ) −>
i f
: : ( ( ! s . sa && !m. mic ) | |
( s . sa && m. mic ) ) −>
s . au = 0 ; s . as = 0 ; s . sa = 0 ;
: : e l s e −> sk ip ;
f i }
/∗ D i s a s s o c i a t i o n p r o c e s s i n g ∗/
: : atomic{
( s . au && m. type == d i s a s s o c &&
m. ch == s . ch ) −>
i f
: : ( ( ! s . sa && !m. mic ) | |
( s . sa && m. mic ) ) −>
s . as = 0 ; s . sa = 0 ;
: : e l s e −> sk ip ;
f i }
/∗ SA Query Request ∗/
: : atomic {(m. type == saqreq && m. mic ) −>
i f
: : ( s . au && s . as && s . sa &&
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m. ch == s . ch ) −>
m. type = saqr e s ; m. c l a s s = 3 ;
m. ch = s . ch ; m. mic = 1 ;
s . lm = m. type ; toSTA ! m;
/∗ STA SA Query timeout ∗/
: : e l s e −>
m. type = saqtime ;
s . lm = DUMMY; toSTA ! m;
f i }
/∗ Received SA Query Response ∗/
: : atomic{
( s . au && s . as && s . sa &&
m. type == saqre s &&
m. ch == s . ch && m. mic ) −>
saqt imeout = 0 ; s a q a c t i v e = 0 ;}
/∗ SA Query timeout ∗/
: : atomic{
(m. type == saqtime ) −>
saqt imeout = 1 ; s a q a c t i v e = 0 ;}
/∗ Received data , send data ∗/
: : atomic{
( s . au && s . as && s . sa &&
m. type == data &&
m. ch == s . ch && m. mic ) −>
m. type = data ; m. c l a s s = 3 ;
m. ch = s . ch ; m. mic = 1 ;
s . lm = m. type ; toSTA ! m;}
/∗ I n v a l i d frame rece ived , s i l e n t l y d i s ca rd ∗/
: : e l s e −> sk ip ;
f i
od
}
proctype STA( ) {
Msg m; State80211 s ;
s . au = 0 ; s . as = 0 ; s . sa = 0 ; s . ch = 1 ;
s . lm = DUMMY; s . lmr = DUMMY;
do
: : t imeout −> t imeout f l ag = 1 ;
i f
/∗ Authent icat ion / a s s o c i a t i o n timeout ∗/
: : atomic{
( ( s . lm == authreq | |
s . lm == assoc r eq ) &&
s . ch == 1 && s . lmr != saqreq ) −>
s . lm = DUMMY;}
/∗ Timeout a f t e r a s s o c i a t i o n ∗/
: : atomic{
( s . au && s . as && ! s . sa
&& s . ch == 1) −>
m. type = deauth ; m. c l a s s = 1 ;
m. ch = s . ch ; m. mic = 0 ;
s . lm = m. type ; s . lmr = DUMMY;
s . au = 0 ; s . as = 0 ;
s . sa = 0 ; toAP ! m;}
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f i
/∗ I n i t i a t e au then t i c a t i on ∗/
: : atomic{
( ! s . au && ! s . as && s . lm != authreq ) −>
m. type = authreq ; m. c l a s s = 1 ;
m. ch = s . ch ; m. mic = 0 ;
s . lm = m. type ; toAP ! m;}
/∗ I n i t i a t e a s s o c i a t i o n ∗/
: : atomic{
( s . au && ! s . as && s . lm != as soc r eq ) −>
m. type = as soc r eq ; m. c l a s s = 2 ;
m. ch = s . ch ; m. mic = 0 ;
s . lm = m. type ; toAP ! m;}
/∗ Reset i f on wrong channel ∗/
: : atomic{
s . ch == 6 −>
s . ch = 1 ; s . au = 0 ; s . as = 0 ; s . sa = 0 ;
s . lm = DUMMY;}
: : atomic{
nempty (toSTA) −>
toSTA ? m; s . lmr = m. type ;}
i f
/∗ Class 2 or 3 frame r e c e i v e d in State 1 ∗/
: : atomic{
( ! s . au && ! s . as && m. c l a s s != 1 &&
m. ch == s . ch && m. type != saqreq ) −>
m. type = deauth ; m. c l a s s = 1 ;
m. ch = s . ch ; m. mic = s . sa ;
s . lm = m. type ; toAP ! m;
s . sa = 0 ;}
/∗ Class 3 frame r e c e i v e d in State 2 ∗/
: : atomic{
( s . au && ! s . as && m. c l a s s == 3 &&
m. ch == s . ch && m. type != saqreq ) −>
m. type = d i s a s s o c ; m. c l a s s = 2 ;
m. ch = s . ch ; m. mic = s . sa ;
s . lm = m. type ; toAP ! m;
s . sa = 0 ;}
/∗ Channel switch ∗/
: : atomic{
(m. type == csw ) −>
i f
: : ( s . ch == 1) −> s . ch = 6 ;
: : ( s . ch == 6) −> s . ch = 1 ;
m. type = data ; m. c l a s s = 3 ;
m. ch = s . ch ; m. mic = s . sa ;
s . lm = m. type ; toAP ! m;
f i
}
/∗ Authent icat ion Response ∗/
: : atomic{
( ! s . au && ! s . as && s . lm == authreq &&
m. type == authresp && m. ch == s . ch ) −>
m. type = as soc r eq ; m. c l a s s = 2 ; m. ch = s . ch ;
m. mic = 0 ; s . lm = m. type ; toAP ! m;
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s . au = 1 ; s . as = 0 ;}
/∗ Assoc i a t i on Response ∗/
: : atomic{
( s . au && ! s . as && s . lm == assoc r eq &&
m. type == as so c r e sp && m. ch == s . ch ) −>
m. type = DUMMY; s . au = 1 ; s . as = 1 ; s . sa = 0 ;}
/∗ EAPOL message 1 ∗/
: : atomic{
( s . au && s . as && m. type == eapol1 ) −>
i f
: : ( ! s . sa && s . lm == assoc r eq &&
m. ch == s . ch ) −>
m. type = eapol2 ; m. c l a s s = 3 ;
m. ch = s . ch ; m. mic = 1 ;
s . lm = m. type ; toAP ! m;
/∗ EAPOL 4−way handshake timeout ∗/
: : e l s e −> m. type = eaptime ; toAP ! m;
s . lm = DUMMY;
f i }
/∗ EAPOL message 3 ∗/
: : atomic{
( s . au && s . as && m. type == eapol3 ) −>
i f
: : ( ! s . sa && s . lm == eapol2 &&
m. ch == s . ch && m. mic ) −>
m. type = eapol4 ; m. c l a s s = 3 ;
m. ch = s . ch ; m. mic = 1 ;
s . lm = m. type ; toAP ! m; s . sa = 1 ;
/∗ EAPOL 4−way handshake timeout ∗/
: : e l s e −> m. type = eaptime ; toAP ! m;
s . lm = DUMMY;
f i }
/∗ Deauthent icat ion ∗/
: : atomic {(m. type == deauth &&
m. ch == s . ch ) −>
i f
: : ( ( ! s . sa && !m. mic ) | |
( s . sa && m. mic ) ) −>
s . au = 0 ; s . as = 0 ;
s . sa = 0 ; s . lm = DUMMY;
: : ( ! r ecovery && s . sa && !m. mic ) −>
sk ip ;
: : ( ! s . sa && m. mic ) −> sk ip ;
/∗ Star t SA Query ∗/
: : ( r ecovery && s . sa && !m. mic ) −>
m. type = saqreq ; m. c l a s s = 3 ;
m. ch = s . ch ; m. mic = 1 ;
s . lm = m. type ; toAP ! m;
f i }
/∗ D i s a s s o c i a t i o n ∗/
: : atomic {( s . au && m. type == d i s a s s o c &&
m. ch == s . ch ) −>
i f
: : ( ( ! s . sa && !m. mic ) | |
( s . sa && m. mic ) ) −>
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s . as = 0 ; s . sa = 0 ;
s . lm = DUMMY;
: : ( ! r ecovery && s . sa && !m. mic ) −>
sk ip ;
: : ( ! s . sa && m. mic ) −> sk ip ;
/∗ Star t SA Query ∗/
: : ( r ecovery && s . sa && !m. mic ) −>
m. type = saqreq ; m. c l a s s = 3 ;
m. ch = s . ch ; m. mic = 1 ;
s . lm = m. type ; toAP ! m;
f i }
/∗ SA Query Request ∗/
: : atomic {(m. type == saqreq && m. mic ) −>
i f
: : ( s . au && s . as && s . sa &&
m. ch == s . ch ) −>
m. type = saqr e s ; m. c l a s s = 3 ;
m. ch = s . ch ; m. mic = 1 ;
s . lm = m. type ; toAP ! m;
/∗ AP SA Query timeout ∗/
: : e l s e −> m. type = saqtime ;
s . lm = DUMMY;
toAP ! m;
f i }
/∗ STA SA Query timeout ∗/
: : atomic{
(m. type == saqtime ) −> s . au = 0 ;
s . as = 0 ; s . sa = 0 ; s . lm = DUMMY;}
/∗ Received data , send data ∗/
: : atomic{
( s . au && s . as && s . sa && m. mic &&
m. type == data && m. ch == s . ch ) −>
m. type = data ; m. c l a s s = 3 ; m. ch = s . ch ;
m. mic = 1 ; s . lm = m. type ; toAP ! m;}
/∗ I n v a l i d frame rece ived , s i l e n t l y d i s ca rd ∗/
: : e l s e −> sk ip ;
f i
od
}
proctype Adversary ( ) {
shor t pkts = 0 ; /∗ Frames transmit ted ∗/
Msg m; m. type = DUMMY; m. c l a s s = 1 ;
m. ch = 1 ; m. mic = 0 ;
do
: : ( pkts >= att ) −>
break ;
: : pkts < at t && ( setup | | e s t a b l i s h e d ) −>
i f
/∗ Exit be f o r e frame l i m i t i s reached ∗/
: : m. type == DUMMY −> break ;
: : m. type == DUMMY && ( pkts > 0) −>
i f
: : t imeout f l ag −>
t imeout f l ag = 0 ;
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f i
: : m. type == DUMMY −>
/∗ Change attack frame type ∗/
i f
/∗ Deauthent icat ion ∗/
: : m. type = deauth −> m. c l a s s = 1 ;
/∗ D i s a s s o c i a t i o n ∗/
: : m. type = d i s a s s o c −> m. c l a s s = 2 ;
/∗ Authent icat ion Request ∗/
: : m. type = authreq −> m. c l a s s = 1 ;
/∗ Authent icat ion Response ∗/
: : m. type = authresp −> m. c l a s s = 1 ;
/∗ Assoc i a t i on Request ∗/
: : m. type = as soc r eq −> m. c l a s s = 2 ;
/∗ Assoc i a t i on Response ∗/
: : m. type = as so c r e sp −> m. c l a s s = 2 ;
/∗ Channel Switch Announcement ∗/
: : dot11h −> m. type = csw ; m. c l a s s = 1 ;
f i
: : m. type != DUMMY −>
i f
/∗ Attack AP ∗/
: : atomic{pkts++; toAP ! m; m. type = DUMMY;}
/∗ Attack STA ∗/
: : atomic{pkts++; toSTA ! m; m. type = DUMMY;}
f i
f i
od
}
i n i t {
atomic{ run AP( ) ; run STA( ) ; run Adversary ( ) ; }
}
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List of Acronyms
3G third generation (mobile network)
4G fourth generation (mobile network)
ACK acknowledgment
AKA authenticated key agreement
AKMP Authentication and Key Management Protocol
AP access point
ARP Address Resolution Protocol
BIP Broadcast/Multicast Integrity Protocol
BSS basic service set
CBC-MAC cipher-block chaining message authentication code
CCMP CTR with CBC-MAC Protocol
COTS commercial off the shelf
CRC cyclic redundancy code
CS carrier sense
CTR counter mode
CTS clear to send
DCF distributed coordination function
DDoS distributed denial of service
DHCP Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol
DIFS distributed (coordination function) interframe space
DoS denial of service
EAP Extensible Authentication Protocol
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EAPOL Extensible Authentication Protocol over LANs
ERP-OFDM extended rate PHY using orthogonal frequency division multiplexing
ESS extended service set
GTK group temporal key
GTKSA group temporal key security association
ICMP Internet Control Message Protocol
ICV integrity check value
IE information element
IFS interframe space
IGTK Integrity GTK
IP Internet Protocol
ITS intelligent transportation systems
LAN local area network
LTE Long Term Evolution (4G)
LTL linear temporal logic
MAC medium access control
MFP Management Frame Protection
MIC message integrity code
NIC network interface card
PC point coordinator
PDU protocol data unit
PHY physical layer
PMK pairwise master key
PMKSA pairwise master key security association
PSK preshared key
PTK pairwise transient key
PTKSA pairwise transient key security association
QoS quality of service
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RF radio frequency
RSN robust security network
SA security association
SCADA supervisory control and data acquisition
SIFS short interframe space
SSID service set identifier
STA station
SYN synchronize
TCP Transmission Control Protocol
TGw IEEE 802.11 Task Group w
TID traffic identifier
TKIP Temporal Key Integrity Protocol
TLA+ Temporal Logic of Actions specification language
TLC TLA+ model checker
TSC TKIP sequence counter
U-NII Unlicensed National Information Infrastructure
WAN wide area network
WEP wired equivalent privacy
WLAN wireless local area network
WMM Wi-Fi Multimedia
95

Bibliography
[1] C. Wullems, K. Tham, J. Smith, and M. Looi, “A trivial denial of service attack
on IEEE 802.11 direct sequence spread spectrum wireless LANs,” in Wireless
Telecommunications Symposium, 2004, may 2004, pp. 129 – 136.
[2] W. Eddy, RFC 4987: TCP SYN Flooding Attacks and Common Mitigations,
2007, http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc4987.
[3] S. Tritilanunt, C. Boyd, E. Foo, and J. Gonzalez Nieto, “Toward non-
parallelizable client puzzles,” in Cryptology and Network Security, ser. Lecture
Notes in Computer Science. Springer-Verlag, 2007, vol. 4856, pp. 247–264.
[4] C. Meadows, “A formal framework and evaluation method for network denial of
service,” IEEE Computer Security Foundations Workshop, vol. 00, p. 4, 1999.
[5] J. Bellardo and S. Savage, “802.11 denial-of-service attacks: Real vulnerabilities
and practical solutions,” in Proceedings of the 12th USENIX Security Symposium.
Berkeley, CA, USA: USENIX Association, 2003.
[6] R. M. Needham, “Denial of service: an example,” Commun. ACM, vol. 37,
no. 11, pp. 42–46, 1994.
[7] D. Dolev and A. C. Yao, “On the security of public key protocols,” Stanford,
CA, USA, Tech. Rep., 1981.
[8] J. Leiwo, T. Aura, and P. Nikander, “Towards network denial of service resistant
protocols,” in Proceedings of the IFIP TC11 Fifteenth Annual Working Confer-
ence on Information Security for Global Information Infrastructures. Kluwer,
B.V., 2000, pp. 301–310.
[9] C. Meadows, “Formal methods for cryptographic protocol analysis: Emerging
issues and trends,” Selected Areas in Communications, IEEE Journal on, vol. 21,
no. 1, pp. 44–54, Jan 2003.
[10] V. Ramachandran, “Analyzing DoS-resistance of protocols using a cost-based
framework,” Yale University, Tech. Rep., 2002.
[11] J. Smith, Denial of Service: Prevention, Modelling and Detection, Brisbane,
Australia, 2007, PhD Thesis, Queensland University of Technology.
97
[12] S. Tritilanunt, Protocol engineering for protection against denial-of-service
attacks, Brisbane, Australia, 2009, PhD Thesis, Queensland University of Tech-
nology.
[13] A. Mahimkar and V. Shmatikov, “Game-based analysis of denial-of-service
prevention protocols,” in Proceedings of the 18th IEEE workshop on Computer
Security Foundations. Washington, DC, USA: IEEE Computer Society, 2005,
pp. 287–301.
[14] M. Fallah, “A puzzle-based defense strategy against flooding attacks using game
theory,” Dependable and Secure Computing, IEEE Transactions on, vol. 7, no. 1,
pp. 5 –19, 2010.
[15] S. Lafrance and J. Mullins, “Using admissible interference to detect denial of
service vulnerabilities,” in Sixth International Workshop in Formal Methods.
Electronic Workshops in Computing (eWiC) by British Computer Society (BCS),
2003, pp. 1–19.
[16] K. Pelechrinis, M. Iliofotou, and V. Krishnamurthy, “Denial of service attacks
in wireless networks: The case of jammers,” Communications Surveys Tutorials,
IEEE, vol. PP, no. 99, pp. 1 –13, 2010.
[17] P. Narayana, R. Chen, Y. Zhao, Y. Chen, Z. Fu, and H. Zhou, “Automatic
vulnerability checking of IEEE 802.16 WiMAX protocols through TLA+,” in
Secure Network Protocols, 2006. 2nd IEEE Workshop on, 2006, pp. 44 –49.
[18] J. Epstein, SA Teardown Protection for 802.11w, IEEE TGw DCN 2441, Rev 3,
2007, https://mentor.ieee.org/802.11/file/07/11-07-2441-03-000w-sa-teardown-
protection.ppt.
[19] M. Eian, “Fragility of the robust security network: 802.11 denial of service,” in
Proceedings of the 7th International Conference on Applied Cryptography and
Network Security, ser. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol. 5536. Springer-
Verlag, 2009, pp. 400–416.
[20] ——, “A practical cryptographic denial of service attack against 802.11i TKIP
and CCMP,” in Proceedings of the Ninth International Conference on Cryptology
And Network Security, ser. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol. 6467.
Springer-Verlag, 2010, pp. 62–75.
[21] M. Eian and S. F. Mjølsnes, “The modeling and comparison of wireless network
denial of service attacks,” in Proceedings of the 3rd ACM SOSP Workshop on
Networking, Systems, and Applications on Mobile Handhelds, ser. MobiHeld ’11.
New York, NY, USA: ACM, 2011, pp. 7:1–7:6.
[22] M. Eian and S. F. Mjølsnes, “A formal analysis of IEEE 802.11w deadlock
vulnerabilities,” in Proceedings of the 31st Annual IEEE International Conference
on Computer Communications (IEEE INFOCOM 2012). IEEE, 2012.
98
BIBLIOGRAPHY
[23] IEEE, IEEE Std 802.11-1999, IEEE Standard for Information technology –
Telecommunications and information exchange between systems – Local and
metropolitan area networks – Specific requirements Part 11: Wireless LAN
Medium Access Control (MAC) and Physical Layer (PHY) Specifications, New
York, NY, USA, 1999.
[24] S. Fluhrer, I. Mantin, and A. Shamir, “Weaknesses in the key scheduling
algorithm of RC4,” in Proceedings of the 4th Annual Workshop on Selected
Areas of Cryptography, 2001, pp. 1–24.
[25] E. Tews, R.-P. Weinmann, and A. Pyshkin, “Breaking 104 bit WEP in
less than 60 seconds,” Cryptology ePrint Archive, Report 2007/120, 2007,
http://eprint.iacr.org/.
[26] A. Bittau, M. Handley, and J. Lackey, “The final nail in WEP’s coffin,” in
SP ’06: Proceedings of the 2006 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy.
Washington, DC, USA: IEEE Computer Society, 2006, pp. 386–400.
[27] C. Devine, T. d’Otreppe, and M. Beck, “Aircrack-ng,” 2011,
http://www.aircrack-ng.org.
[28] IEEE, IEEE Std 802.11-2007, IEEE Standard for Information technology –
Telecommunications and information exchange between systems – Local and
metropolitan area networks – Specific requirements Part 11: Wireless LAN
Medium Access Control (MAC) and Physical Layer (PHY) Specifications, New
York, NY, USA, 2007.
[29] ——, IEEE Std 802.11i-2004, IEEE 802.11-1999 Amendment 6: Medium Access
Control (MAC) Security Enhancements, New York, NY, USA, 2004.
[30] ——, IEEE Std 802.11w-2009, IEEE 802.11-2007 Amendment 4: Protected
Management Frames, New York, NY, USA, 2009.
[31] J. Epstein, SA Teardown Protection, IEEE TGw DCN 2461, Rev 8,
2007, https://mentor.ieee.org/802.11/file/07/11-07-2461-08-000w-sa-teardown-
protection-text.doc.
[32] B. Aboba, L. Blunk, J. Vollbrecht, J. Carlson, and H. Lev-
kowetz, RFC 3748: Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP), 2004,
http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc3748.
[33] IEEE, IEEE Std 802.11X-2004, New York, NY, USA, 2004.
[34] Wireshark, http://www.wireshark.org.
[35] M. D. Aime, G. Calandriello, and A. Lioy, “Dependability in wireless networks:
Can we rely on WiFi?” IEEE Security and Privacy, vol. 5, no. 1, pp. 23–29,
2007.
99
[36] S. Glass and V. Muthukkumarasamy, “A study of the TKIP cryptographic DoS
attack,” in ICON 2007: Proceedings of the 15th IEEE International Conference
on Networks. New York, NY, USA: IEEE, 2007, pp. 59–65.
[37] E. Tews and M. Beck, “Practical attacks against WEP and WPA,” in WiSec
’09: Proceedings of the second ACM conference on Wireless network security.
New York, NY, USA: ACM, 2009, pp. 79–86.
[38] IEEE, IEEE Std 802.11e-2005, New York, NY, USA, 2005.
[39] F. M. Halvorsen, O. Haugen, M. Eian, and S. F. Mjølsnes, “An improved attack
on TKIP,” in NordSec ’09: Proceedings of the 14th Nordic Conference on Secure
IT Systems. Berlin, Heidelberg: Springer-Verlag, 2009, pp. 120–132.
[40] B. Ko¨nings, F. Schaub, F. Kargl, and S. Dietzel, “Channel switch and quiet
attack: New DoS attacks exploiting the 802.11 standard,” in LCN 2009: Pro-
ceedings of the IEEE 34th Conference on Local Computer Networks, 2009, pp.
14–21.
[41] IEEE, IEEE Std 802.11h-2003, IEEE 802.11-1999 Amendment 5: Spectrum
and Transmit Power Management Extensions in the 5 GHz band in Europe,
New York, NY, USA, 2003.
[42] D. Harkins, Attacks against Michael and Their Countermeasures. IEEE
802.11 Working Group Document 03/211r0, New York, NY, USA,
2003. [Online]. Available: http://web.archive.org/web/20051226133200/http:
//www.ieee802.org/11/Documents/DocumentHolder/3-211.zip
[43] The OpenWrt Project, “OpenWrt,” 2011, http://www.openwrt.org.
[44] J. Malinen, “hostapd: IEEE 802.11 AP, IEEE 802.1X / WPA / WPA2 / EAP
/ RADIUS Authenticator,” 2011, http://hostap.epitest.fi/hostapd.
[45] J. Zarate, “Tomato Firmware,” 2009, http://www.polarcloud.com/tomato.
[46] D. C. Plummer, RFC 826: An Ethernet Address Resolution Protocol, 1982,
http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc826.
[47] R. Droms, RFC 2131: Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol, 1997,
http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc2131.
[48] Cisco Systems Inc., Enterprise Mobility 4.1 Design Guide, San Jose, CA, USA,
2009.
[49] T. Han, N. Zhang, K. Liu, B. Tang, and Y. Liu, “Analysis of mobile WiMAX
security: Vulnerabilities and solutions,” in Mobile Ad Hoc and Sensor Systems,
2008. MASS 2008. 5th IEEE International Conference on, 2008, pp. 828 –833.
100
BIBLIOGRAPHY
[50] G. Kambourakis, C. Kolias, S. Gritzalis, and J. Hyuk-Park, “Signaling-oriented
DoS attacks in UMTS networks,” in Advances in Information Security and
Assurance, ser. Lecture Notes in Computer Science. Springer-Verlag, 2009, vol.
5576, pp. 280–289.
[51] C. Sankaran, “Network access security in next-generation 3GPP systems: A
tutorial,” Communications Magazine, IEEE, vol. 47, no. 2, pp. 84 –91, 2009.
[52] J. Malinen, “Linux WPA/WPA2/IEEE 802.1X Supplicant,” 2011,
http://hostap.epitest.fi/wpa supplicant.
[53] IEEE, IEEE Std 802.11g-2003, New York, NY, USA, 2003.
[54] G. Holzmann, Spin model checker, the: primer and reference manual, 1st ed.
Addison-Wesley Professional, 2003.
[55] IEEE, IEEE Std 802.11r-2008, New York, NY, USA, 2008.
[56] G. J. Holzmann, “The model checker SPIN,” IEEE Trans. Softw. Eng., vol. 23,
pp. 279–295, May 1997.
[57] M. S. Ahmad and S. Tadakamadla, “Short paper: security evaluation of IEEE
802.11w specification,” in Proceedings of the fourth ACM conference on Wireless
network security, ser. WiSec ’11. New York, NY, USA: ACM, 2011, pp. 53–58.
[58] J. Mitchell, A. Roy, P. Rowe, and A. Scedrov, “Analysis of EAP-GPSK au-
thentication protocol,” in Proceedings of the 6th International Conference on
Applied Cryptography and Network Security, ser. Lecture Notes in Computer
Science, vol. 5037. Springer-Verlag, 2008, pp. 309–327.
[59] M. Eian and S. F. Mjølsnes, “802.11w promela model,” 2011,
http://www.item.ntnu.no/∼eian/80211w.pml.
101
